robwwilliams 15 minutes ago

Seth does not need to wear a priest’s robe. In other work he has already approached mechanistic explanations of consciousness. His backtracking here agitates me. Word games with definitions of intelligence versus consciousness do not help. And this much to long essay is elegant hot air.

Nagel’s question “what is it like to be” should be retired as jejune, circular, and meaningless. An observer cannot ask that question and expect an answer. Humberto Maturana made this obvious in The Biology of Cognition in 1970, and Seth is smart enough to understand Maturana. Many enactivist philosophers struggle with the 1970 paper. I suspect the problem is they do not know as much neuroscience as Maturana or as is needed to understand his points.

Maturana, H. R. (1970). Biology of Cognition. BCL Report No. 9.0. Urbana, IL: Biological Computer Laboratory, Department of Electrical Engineering, University of Illinois.

Reprinted in 1980 in Autopoiesis and Cognition

https://link.springer.com/book/10.1007/978-94-009-8947-4

imeanwhatdoikno 5 hours ago

Absolutely fascinating topic but if there ever was a good time to say "we have no clue and should reserve any judgement" it's about consciousness.

How can you rule anything out when you can't even observe/verify the phenomenon from a 3rd person perspective, let alone form a falsifiable theory about how it arises

  • altmanaltman 4 hours ago

    That's not fully true, though. If you shoot something that was conscious and kill it, it stops being conscious. So you can observe/verify the phenomenon from a 3rd-person perspective, but you can't study it objectively.

    Furthermore, we know a lot about the brain itself and how impacts/defects can affect the conscious experience.

    It is true that we cannot ever experience consciousness outside our subjective experience, but it is surely verifiable/observable from a third-person view (or rather its effects).

    • chamomeal 2 hours ago

      > (or rather its effects)

      I think that’s the tricky part. Hence the whole idea of the philosophical zombie. You can’t be sure anything besides yourself has consciousness, or is just imitating consciousness

    • unrented7977 1 hour ago

      No, you've only identified the difference between alive and dead. Death removes the possibility of consciousness, but does not imply the entity was conscious while it was alive.

      Otherwise you're making the argument that anything alive is conscious, and I don't think that's really the argument you want to make here.

      • kilpikaarna 48 minutes ago

        > Death removes the possibility of consciousness

        You don’t actually know this either.

        (Many many subjective reports point to consciousness persisting in some form after the death of the physical body. Before birth too.)

    • zeroxfe 46 minutes ago

      > If you shoot something that was conscious and kill it, it stops being conscious.

      This assumes you have a way to measure consciousness, which is the fundamental problem.

  • graemep 4 hours ago

    We can, however, observe it from a first person perspective.

    We can make inferences from observations.

    Its great when you have a testable falsifiable hypothesis, but knowledge can advance in other ways. That is how we get philosophical ideas, such as the concept of falsifiable hypotheses.

    • itsalwaysgood 1 hour ago

      The conversation will always steer philosophical about what it means to exist.

      Life affords experience and knowledge: you are born not knowing anything, and you quickly learn about touch, hunger, gravity, pain, etc. You start to build up truths about how the world works, and how you move about it. You learn balance through trial-and-error, and many other things. A lot of this knowledge becomes innate, and we lose awareness of it (you had to think about how to walk a lot more as a child than you do now). Consciousness is thinking, and awareness of what's happening inside and outside of you.

      If you want to look at things from a first-person perspective: a machine's awareness is its context window. By itself, it can only think about what's in context, and it can only decide by what its model 'knows'. A machine thinks, its awareness is very limited by what we've given it, and it has almost no awareness of what's happening beyond the conversation and whatever news it can access.

      If you put an AI in a robot body, and then put a machine in charge of persistence, and another machine in charge of learning, and another in charge of balance, maybe another one in charge of processing vision and audio sensors, etc., and you string it all together so it moves in perfect harmony and you lose the ability to distinguish it from something that was born wet: would we consider the combination of machines conscious?

      Probably, but we're so far from this that it seems fancy to even discuss it in the first place. It's like arguing for living tissue rights in medical research: a cell is surely alive, but few are aruing for their right to exist, or questioning what its like to exist as a cell. We only worry about damage the research might cause to bigger conscious things.

      • unrented7977 1 hour ago

        > you are born not knowing anything

        That's not true at all. All animals, us included, are born with certain instincts hardwired into our neurology. The brain doesn't start out as a blob of undifferentiated neurons, it has predefined structure and connections.

        This is opposed to neural networks which do start out as undifferentiated neurons (roughly) and have to learn literally everything from scratch. We impose some structure during design, but the weights start out random.

        The baseline mammal brain starts out full of programming learned over millions of years. We don't have the first clue what information or even how much is contained in our base programming. Maybe that's where consciousness arises from.

  • Betelbuddy 3 hours ago

    We could start by taking away all stolen data from our current AIs, give them a couple of books, and ask if they can graduate high school...

    • Toynbeeidea 1 hour ago

      How is "giving them books" different from "stolen data?"

      • Betelbuddy 35 minutes ago

        When I did my Calculus classes, I had only one second hand book I could afford. I did not need to steal and tokenize on my head 234,456 Calculus books...plus 456,345,300 internet pages.

        Once I failed to return two books to the library, and they sent me a threatening letter...

  • voidhorse 3 hours ago

    I'm always surprised when people say this about LLMs. I find it much harder to believe that stateless functions running across a host of data centers fulfilling requests on demand could be conscious than not.

    The whole "substrate doesn't matter" thing is correctly called mythology. It's one of the only extremely unscientific beliefs I hear otherwise intelligent people profess easily today and I think it speaks to some kind of inherent religiosity in humanity or something. The belief that computation == consciousness has basically no basis other than rather weak analogies between the brain and digital computers. Yes brains have a sophisticated digital component but they also have extremely complicated specific evolved structure, embodiment, a nervous system, and chemistry going on too. It's total crankery to me to think that some stateless function that generates bits is "conscious"

    • pingou 3 hours ago

      Why is substrate independence more unscientific than assuming biology has a monopoly on consciousness?

      What do you mean by "it speaks to some kind of inherent religiosity"? If anything, insisting that consciousness requires special biological magic sounds a lot more like religious thinking to me than believing it emerges from information processing.

      • voidhorse 1 hour ago

        What sounds more amenable to scientific investigation to you:

        a. Consciousness "emerges" with sufficient computation. Throw enough computation at something and suddenly you have consciousness.

        b. Consciousness results from specific substantive mechanics biological, physiological, computational, wiring in concert in a complicated fashion, as a necessary consequence of structure plus computation.

        The people who believe LLMs might be conscious are basically in camp a. because they are effectively saying it arises out of stateless statistical inference.

        Another way in which "just do more and more computation" isn't sufficient: rats are far less cognitively and computationally sophisticated than humans, yet they are conscious.

        I'm not saying computation has no role to play. I'm saying naive views which would reduce the problem to "lots of computation" or just "lots of data" are silly.

    • dist-epoch 3 hours ago

      It's just as religious to insist that electrons/atoms/molecules interacting in a human brain gives rise to consciousness, but that electrons/atoms/molecules interacting in a computer chip could never give rise to consciousness there.

      Extremely unscientific, the definition of "belief".

    • showlife 3 hours ago

      But do you think that that extremely complicated specific evolved structure etc. is completely unamenable to analysis and gradual simulation/quantization? You might think that the "substrate doesn't matter" proponents are calling the game early, but if you can be honest, you might be calling the game early in the other direction.

    • hardbass 3 hours ago

      I can swap you one by one for electrical devices that emit the chemicals and electrical signals of each part of you. At what point due to it being a different substrate are you no longer conscious?

      • sseagull 2 hours ago

        That’s an interesting thought experiment but you left yourself a loophole with “emit the chemicals”. The argument(I think?) is that consciousness is not a purely digital or maybe even computational phenomenon - once you start involving molecules and “real” matter then you start agreeing with them that consciousness requires some sort of physical/chemical component.

        Also this kind of Sorites paradox/Ship of Theseus argument works both ways - multiplying two numbers isn’t consciousness, and what point does doing math on a bunch of numbers become consciousness?

        • hardbass 2 hours ago

          Computers are physical systems, they don't exist in the ether somewhere. They require physical chips and electricity, just like humans require chemical electrical signalling.

          I am saying if we continue this process, you are still human, thus disproving that consciousness is substrate dependent.

          If you want to say anythign that uses only electricity is different from those that uses both electrical and chemicals, then why have this arbitrary delineation, we can furthermore begin asserting a particular human beings configuration can support consciousness but others can't so just that something is differently conscious, which all people are from each other is by itself insufficient.

          After that, nobody has yet proven the universe supports hypercomputation, and any Turing Computer can in principle do any other Turing program. So the human brain...is not special.

    • imeanwhatdoikno 3 hours ago

      Could hypothetical silicon-based aliens be conscious? If you replaced each neuron in your brain with some sort of elaborate artificial electronic/mechanical/chemical equivalent, would you still be conscious? If not, at what point would you stop being conscious as you go through this replacement process?

      • detourdog 2 hours ago

        Is this different than the ship of Theseus question. Seems to be the identical question and I think one would answer the question the same way.

        • Calazon 2 hours ago

          The ship of Theseus is about whether it is the same ship. This question is about whether it is a "real" ship at all. The point being that of course it's a real ship.

    • hardbass 3 hours ago

      >computation == consciousness has basically

      The basis in the physical Church Turing hypothesis. Disprove it, nobody is stopping you.

      • danlitt 2 hours ago

        There is no need to disprove things that are asserted without evidence.

        • hardbass 2 hours ago

          You can easily disprove it. Find any physical process that hypercomputes. I am waiting for it.

        • Eisenstein 2 hours ago

          'It is possible that a computer can be conscious' requires no evidence without a mechanism for consciousness that isn't tautological.

      • filoeleven 2 hours ago

        This paper about polycomputing doesn't disprove physical Church-Turing, but it does seem to point to the substrate mattering more than it's given credit. I'm presenting this as something else to chew on for the curious, not as an argument for or against anything. From the abstract:

        > We refer to this as "polycomputing" - the ability of the same substrate to simultaneously compute different things. This ability is an important way in which living things are a kind of computer, but not the familiar, linear, deterministic kind; rather, living things are computers in the broad sense of computational materials as reported in the rapidly-growing physical computing literature.

        https://arxiv.org/abs/2212.10675

      • sseagull 2 hours ago

        Here's what I believe your argument is, although correct me if I am wrong:

        1. The brain is a physical system. (I agree)

        2. All physical systems can be computationally simulated (physical Church–Turing thesis) (I agree)

        3. Therefore, the brain can be computationally simulated (I agree in theory, although likely forever impractical)

        4. Therefore, a sufficiently accurate computational simulation of the brain would be conscious. (where I don't necessarily agree)

        There is a huge jump from 3 to 4 that you are asserting without evidence. From your comments here and elsewhere, you are basically a computationalist, which is a fine and common position - however, the Church-Turing and related theses aren't enough by themselves to establish computationalism about consciousness.

        • hardbass 2 hours ago

          3 and 4 is part of it, its for showing an equivalent human brain. They are not necessary for other forms of consciousness (eg indeed other animals), which as we haven't yet had any definition cannot precisely prove or disprove other similar physical entities are or or not conscious. I can be sure of what is of course absurd ie belief in souls until proven, any idea or theory that violates known physical laws without disproving those laws. Beyond that, I make no further claim than a form something like functionalism, if it talks and behaves too much like us, be cautious about the question of consciousness.

          The biggest thing of asking this question is that any philosophy or theory must first answer to reality, if it makes claims that violate known computability and physical laws then we cannot proceed any further with such a theory currently.

        • hardbass 2 hours ago

          >4. Therefore, a sufficiently accurate computational simulation of the brain would be conscious. (where I don't necessarily agree)

          Where is your gap for disagreement?

          • sseagull 1 hour ago

            Well, keep in mind that this is your (very strong) assertion to prove, rather than mine to disprove. As I said, computationalism is a respectable position, but there's much more to it than Turing machines and stuff.

            To me, in all other areas, a simulation of a thing isn't the thing. Winning a wargame doesn't mean you won a war. And a highly accurate simulation of an antibiotic didn't cure my infection. (I know we've discussed this :) )

            If we take a simulation of the human brain and instead do it by hand, all the math on pieces of paper, maybe employing millions of human computers, is that bunch of paper conscious? Where does that consciousness reside?

            Not necessarily you hardbass, but anyone interested can start here https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/computation-physicalsyste...

            • MrScruff 1 hour ago

              If the simulation is sufficiently accurate, would you agree that any behaviours in the thing should be reproduced by the simulation of the thing? Otherwise surely we must conclude that there is something not modelled by the simulation. Given that consciousness is an emergent process in biological machines, which are presumably bound by the laws of physics, then what bit of physics would we be missing if we had a sufficiently accurate simulation, in order to model consciousness?

            • hardbass 48 minutes ago

              There is a difference yes. A simulation of a storm does not cause rainfall, but a human body itself is also already composed of many smaller units, we can argue how much individual capacity for agency each cell as but the human as a whole is thinking, so any other assembly of smaller agents can obviously also experience some form of consciousness. We cannot point to an individual cell or neuron that experiences it, they probably won't even know eg the gut bacterium, so it is clearly some form of macro organization. Another point is that, again I can swap out part of my brain for a device that exists outside in part or whole as long as it satisfies the timing and input/output of the organ or part it is replicating. I am still me and I am still conscious obviously. Your point is good, since a simulation of a storm does not rain. But a "simulation" of factoring a large composite number actually does factor it. Brains as far as we know are the seat that is taking sense inputs and providing it as experience to the person. So a large assemblage of humans writing each molecule of the brain by hand can very much be a brain, in the same way a program to compute or factor something is a program once its actually executed.

              That is a very interesting link that gathers various views of computation, so thank you for it. I will read it.

        • bartnp 24 minutes ago

          I think it might even break down at step 2 already. While you can 'simulate' as in 'approximate' reality, you might not actually get it to be fully accuracte ever, even on simple toy systems. If space is continuous then you may need infinite storage just to completely accurately represent the position of one particle. And that's assuming a classical style reality, it might well get harder if reality is quantum at its base level and you have to somehow perfectly represent a probabilistic wave function everywhere. And if you can't even be entirely accurate on step 2, it's tenuous whether you can do 3.

          Steelmanning, the obvious retort is that perhaps the state of the brain doesn't need to be simulated at such accuracies. But the chaos effect shows that even tiny accuracy errors can accumulate to cause entirely different behavior. An approximated brain may end up deviating from a real one even on very short timescales even if you try really hard. While that might not neccessarily be an issue for consciousness, the jury is still out on that since we don't even understand what causes it to begin with. I think it's far from a settled matter and would require good supporting evidence thats currently unavailable.

          • hardbass 10 minutes ago

            It could be a chaotic system, but various humans already exist and don't lose consciousness randomly and regain so the status of consciousness itself is not chaotic, though trying to make an exact copy of a particular state of consciousness might be. And as you said we don't know to what precision simulating it is necessary to result in a working model, eg we don't need to do QM to make a car.

    • txrx0000 2 hours ago

      The whole "substrate doesn't matter" thing - doesn't matter, because all computation happens on matter-based substrates. Are you sure your consciousness isn't caused by some electron interaction thing in the brain? Suppose that's true, then the right program can make electrons move the right way in a chip. There is no proof either way because we don't know what makes it happen in our own brains.

    • otabdeveloper4 2 hours ago

      > I'm always surprised when people say this about LLMs.

      AI intelligence doesn't really exist, but AI psychosis certainly does.

      Remember that these are machines that are scientifically designed to maximize our built-in anthropomorphizing tendencies.

    • tescreal 2 hours ago

      My key problem with this thinking is for any mechanism in the brain, a sufficient analog can be produced in silicon. Direct neuron connections are as good as solved (and we could well do biologically-equivilant activation functions), and distance-modulations via chemical emissions and admissions are just another matrix over selected neuron types.

      The thing is, substrate independence states not that mechanisms are directly equal so much as all mechanisms can have equivalents (as opposed to soul-like / dualist spooky action from an otherwise unincorporated component).

      • voidhorse 1 hour ago

        > for any mechanism in the brain, a sufficient analog can be produced in silicon

        First of all, I think that's a bold claim. If you model an analogic system digitally is it really the same thing?

        Second of all, surely you realize a painting of a pipe and a pipe itself are not the same.

        There's nothing "magic" about arguments that require specific substances for function to obtain. That's literally just how nature and reality work. What's more mystic is the notion that a representation can indeed become the thing itself.

        But that stated, yes, if you were to realize the complete structure of a biological being in metal and silicon, I'd be more willing to admit consciousness might obtain. What I'm against is some notion that merely with enough compute, structure be damned, you'd have consciousness. The argument that LLMs are conscious would need to posit that the bulk of brain structure does not matter in the slightest.

      • ZenoArrows 1 hour ago

        > My key problem with this thinking is for any mechanism in the brain, a sufficient analog can be produced in silicon.

        That is true, but designing an AI this way would be horribly inefficient and would be nowhere near as intelligent as our LLMs are now.

        Which begs the question, is consciousness actually desirable for an AI system? We want autonomous agents, but would actual human-like consciousness make an AI better at completing a task rather than just horribly inefficient at it?

        • kadoban 21 minutes ago

          > That is true, but designing an AI this way would be horribly inefficient and would be nowhere near as intelligent as our LLMs are now.

          That's not really the point of the thought exercise.

          The point is: if I'm conscious with a brain made of goop, and if we could simulate my goop brain with 100% fidelity of function in silicon, then what stops silicon being conscious?

          And if nothing, then where is the line? Why are llms not conscious (they probably shouldn't be?), but other possible silicon brains could be?

          • heyjamesknight 13 minutes ago

            We absolutely cannot simulate your goop brain with 100% fidelity in silicon. We can simulate it at some level of abstraction, but we have no idea at what layer consciousness is occurring.

      • heyjamesknight 16 minutes ago

        We have absolutely no way of capturing the complexity of a real brain in silicon. There's no way to accurately "simulate" continuous time on a discrete computer. Neither time nor space are quantized.

        There's just too much detail in reality to believe an image of that reality would have significant resolution to reproduce consciousness.

  • eaurouge 47 minutes ago

    The fact that you’ll need to engineer executive control, motivation, and arousal into such a system before even contemplating consciousness tells me we would have to go out of our way to create intelligence that could truly mimic consciousness as we experience it. So this isn’t really a question we should ever be in a position to wrestle with. Of course, anyone is free to confer consciousness on any human-like intelligence, but that’s not very different from duck typing.

  • leafingensemble 15 minutes ago

    Radical agnosticism is the wrong way to approach knowledge.

    The hypothesis is unfounded, and therefore false, until it is proven.

    This avoids creating justified beliefs in things which are not supported by evidence, like ghosts, natural remedies, the existence of bigfoot, God, and all other unfalsifiable Pascal wagers.

    "The sun will not rise tomorrow". Plausible, if you are agnostic/skeptical.

    "A rock is conscious". Also unfalsifiable, and plausible.

    "I reserve judgement about the laws of physics, which could be completely wrong (have been wrong in the past)." A bad world view.

openasocket 2 hours ago

I feel like there’s all of these conversations about whether AI is conscious or not, but never address the immediate ethical implications. If you believe an agent swarm is conscious, doesn’t that mean using it to do something is, by definition, slavery? I personally don’t think these things are conscious, but I do find it concerning that those that do think it is conscious, or soon will be, don’t even address that point. There’s a certain ironic repetition of Frankenstein happening: people obsessed with creating life from non-life, and yet completely unprepared and uninterested is the consequences.

  • whichquestion 1 hour ago

    Is a bee that we milk for honey, conscious?

    • viklove 1 hour ago

      We don't milk bees for honey, you should have used cows or pigs or literally anything else as an example. Bees are actually treated quite nicely, and actually willingly build their hives on a beekeeper's land.

  • t_e_s 1 hour ago

    I'm not sure what you're talking about - the article immediately states that the point of asking if they're conscious is to identify if they're moral patients. I see similar discussions in this thread.

  • viklove 1 hour ago

    The individuals advancing/funding AI would turn us all into slaves if they could, it would be extremely convenient for them. They don't give a shit if their slaves are conscious or human, as long as it's making them boat loads of money.

    If you want to take a spin on the capitalism rollercoaster, you have to leave your morals at the door.

    • helterskelter2 1 hour ago

      Anthropic still employing the guy pressuring employees into those CNC orgies says a lot about their benevolent (and definitely not sociopathic) attitude toward humanity.

      These are the kind of people you want separated from the rest of society.

hax0ron3 13 hours ago

Consciousness might not necessarily emerge when there is enough computation, but we also don't know that it doesn't emerge. We really know almost nothing about consciousness. It's possible that the question of why the presence of consciousness is correlated with certain kinds of material organization is in principle not accessible to scientific investigation. We don't even know that it is so correlated in general, we just know that for example people report being conscious when they are not asleep and not drugged in certain ways, and report having had no experience of consciousness during dreamless sleep or when drugged in certain ways. Most people feel that for example rocks are not conscious, but other people are conscious, but there's no rigorous scientific explanation backing up any of those hunches.

  • za_creature 13 hours ago

    https://writings.stephenwolfram.com/2024/10/on-the-nature-of...

    Stephen Wolfram suggests an intimate relationship between awareness, thermodynamics and the one-way passage of time. Something along the lines of "consciousness is the universe understanding itself".

    • addaon 12 hours ago

      > Stephen Wolfram suggests

      So that's one strong argument against it, but I don't think it's sufficient to discard the idea entirely.

      • za_creature 12 hours ago

        I didn't.

        • isomorphic_duck 12 hours ago

          They were being sarcastic.

          • za_creature 5 hours ago

            I know. I was agreeing with them that he talks a lot. It's still an interesting idea.

      • nomel 11 hours ago

        Context for this shade?

        • rwmj 3 hours ago

          He's undoubtedly a genius, but also has some pretty odd ideas that verge on the pseudoscientific eg https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/A_New_Kind_of_Science

          • za_creature 3 hours ago

            The funny thing is that the same criticism applies to modern LLM training which is primarily driven by vibes (or more formally, by empiricism).

            I guess criticism just bounces off you when you are systematically dismantling science.

    • inopinatus 12 hours ago

      This reminds me somehow of Penrose's idea about the quantum<>gravity interface being the same missing physics as consciousness. Penrose wants spacetime geometry to be fundamental, Wolfram thinks it is causal structure, neither ends up at a satisfactory explanation of conscious perception.

      • za_creature 2 hours ago

        I am more intrigued by the link to time. We are all living in the past since it takes time for the signal to move from the various sensors and into the brain.

        IIRC, baseball is an example of this: the batter doesn't get a chance to actually see the ball leaving the pitcher's hand, everything happens before that in what could be described as an intense game of poker.

    • bitwize 8 hours ago

      Compression might be consciousness as well.

      • za_creature 1 hour ago

        Then black holes are superintelligence in a dark forest.

  • soon_to_be_sb 13 hours ago

    >Consciousness might not necessarily emerge when there is enough computation

    Does a circle "emerge" only when you plot it? Or did it always existed? What if there is a little world with conscious beings inside a circle? Did their subjective experience started when you plotted the circle, or did it exist along with the abstract idea of a circle always (though "always" is a meaningless word here).

    The question we should be asking is "Is it possible for subjective experience to exist inside abstract things" with out such abstract things being rendered?

    The answer is hard because we does not know yet if there is an absolute reality at all, which means "being rendered" does not really move things from the abstract plane, and does not really make a difference..

    Damn! did any of that make any sort of sense?

    • talon8635 12 hours ago

      Shrodingers circle

      • soon_to_be_sb 12 hours ago

        Do you think if there is an absolute reality at all?

        I think there is not. I think there is no "absolute" anything. Even you can't be absolute. You can't be special. Look at the patterns on your wall. It can't be absolute. Because if it is absolute, someone has to pick it. That is not possible, because then that entity needs to be absolute, and then someone needs to pick it! That goes all the way...

        So nothing can be absolute and everything is abstract and every variant of something exists in some reality so nothing needs to be picked by anyone...

    • rramadass 11 hours ago

      The "illusion" of Reality as we perceive it should not be confused with the separate distinct Reality itself. Ontology and Epistemology are separate.

      A great quote from Samkhya/Yoga philosophy is;

      Objective Reality exists independently of the Mind because it is commonly experienced by others besides Oneself".

      Your example of a circle/abstract things is not really logical. They are inert, while to even talk about consciousness you need dynamism i.e. passage-of-time, experience and cause-and-effect.

      • deepfriedchokes 10 hours ago

        If objective reality existed we would be able to predict precise results rather than probabilities.

        • oilkillsbirds 10 hours ago

          We have to compute probabilities because the only thing capable of computing reality is the universe itself. Everything else can only be a piece of the whole and the piece cannot ever compute the whole exactly

        • rramadass 4 hours ago

          Reality does not have to be deterministic at every level. You can have indeterminism at the quantum level while being deterministic at the aggregate macro level (hence quantum statistical mechanics). Non-determinism allows for multiple possible paths to branch out from an event.

          • soon_to_be_sb 2 hours ago

            I believe OP is saying that if there is one true objective reality, then there would be no room for probabilities. (because there is nothing to branch out to)

            • rramadass 1 hour ago

              Nope. At any point in time an event may or may not occur. If it occurs then there could be multiple outcomes (probabilities) one of which actually happens. Reality is potentialities (not predetermined) out of which Time concretely realizes one path.

              • soon_to_be_sb 1 hour ago

                So there is no absolute reality, so you are in agreement with OP, it seems.

      • soon_to_be_sb 9 hours ago

        >They are inert, while to even talk about consciousness you need dynamism i.e. passage-of-time, experience and cause-and-effect.

        This is not really a blocker. A video file is also inert, but video player can play it, showing a video where there is passage of time, cause and effect etc.

        The internal consciousnesses just need to experience slices of it in correspondence to its internal "time"...

        >Objective Reality exists independently of the Mind because it is commonly experienced by others besides Oneself".

        Everyone plugged into matrix shared the same reality. Did that make it real?

        • rramadass 4 hours ago

          Your examples are funny ;-)

          A video player has no consciousness as to what it is doing. It is a separate observer (i.e. you) who experiences passage of time and events in it by watching it play. The dynamism must be perceived by somebody.

          W.r.t. The Matrix, you missed the point which i made in the very first line. If a group of people are bounded within a box then those people have a Reality which only turns out to be an Illusion when they compare it with somebody outside the box. That is what the philosophical quote implies.

          • soon_to_be_sb 2 hours ago

            >The dynamism must be perceived by somebody.

            The "somebody" could be a consciousness that is also arising/part of the abstract structure. So in a way it is somehow observing slices of itself. (yea universe dreaming about itself).

    • throwup238 11 hours ago

      I prefer the Wittgenstein approach: a “circle” is a language game and which game you’re playing depends on both the current context and the context in which you learned to play the game (of which there may be parallel strands and they may be incompatible).

      After that it’s just rule-following all the way down.

  • roenxi 12 hours ago

    It is quite a funny situation when people have to debate whether a property that cannot be tested, defined or even described with any precision is possessed by some given thing. It goes beyond a lack of science, there is an interesting debate about whether the topic can even be approached academically. We're in the territory of priests here.

    • aleksiy123 11 hours ago

      It’s the ultimate nerd snipe, or red herring.

      I feel like I’m in the camp of this question of consciousness doesn’t actually matter at all.

      It’s an appeal to emotion. We will give ai the right of consciousness when ai will convince the majority (?) of us that it is conscious.

      The logic of it doesn’t matter in practice and probably can’t even be proven anyways.

      It’s made up, no one can even prove themselves or other humans are conscious. And it doesn’t even matter.

      • soon_to_be_sb 9 hours ago

        Is the pain that you feel (not "show") when somebody pinches you, made up?

        • matwood 9 hours ago

          I’m confused what this has to do with the thread?

          Pain is just an electrical response sent to the brain to alert the organism something potentially bad is happening.

          • soon_to_be_sb 8 hours ago

            Well, for starters, If a thing is conscious, and has the ability to suffer or rewarded, then it becomes a question of ethics if it is right to make it suffer without a corresponding reward.

            So it is not really correct to claim that the question whether a thing is conscious or not, does not matter.

            • matwood 6 hours ago

              But you're equating consciousness with pain/suffering and reward? I mean, we can certainly wire up an AI to 'feel' pain and suffering and reward it for avoiding those - is it now conscious? Even in humans it's just an electrical response.

              • hardbass 6 hours ago

                Yes, a very painful and unpleasant electrical response. Would you mind if I shock you?

              • soon_to_be_sb 5 hours ago

                > we can certainly wire up an AI to 'feel' pain and suffering and reward it for avoiding those -

                Lol, no, you are fundamentally wrong here. What you call pain here is something else that I don't think we are on the same page..

                • hardbass 5 hours ago

                  What is pain in a human? What if I find the neural activations that cause pain and activate it in you? I think its hard or impossible to know from outside, some might say, but you just read out some electrical signals so what, so I prefer to keep the view that be cautious about mistreating anything you might think has a good chance of being conscious.

      • myaccountonhn 8 hours ago

        I agree that the arguments will basically be theological. That said even if we can't know if it is conscious, depending on what people believe it can have very large consequences on society and cause IMO a lot of harm. So I do think it matters.

      • InsideOutSanta 6 hours ago

        > The logic of it doesn’t matter in practice

        It matters because we should afford certain rights to entities with consciousness that we don't need to afford to entities without consciousness.

        • pixl97 3 hours ago

          How should you treat a mimic?

        • aleksiy123 2 hours ago

          My point is that is largely an emotional decision and not actually based on logic.

          Once enough people are emotionally convinced by AI that it is conscious we will alter the logic/definition of consciousness to include AI.

      • TheOtherHobbes 4 hours ago

        It matters because subjective experience matters.

        A big part of the argument about whether LLMs are conscious is an implied "Should we be kind to them? Or are indifference and experimentation which may be experienced as painful okay?"

        So clearly it's at least partly about ethics.

        If there's no consciousness there's no subjective experience. Or - at best - it's an illusion.

        Which means morality is irrelevant, and you may as well murder, rape, and steal your way to whatever goals you're imagining because none of your victims are experiencing anything real.

        • pixl97 3 hours ago

          >Should we be kind to them?

          Let's imagine we can make a machine that we know is 100% not conscious, but it mimics its environment. What you put into it you get out of it.

          Does it make sense to be kind to this machine?

          Now for the next question, what if we make continuous learning AI? Does consciousness matter if it learns being total unkind assholes is just how it should behave?

          We're going to drive ourselves extinct with the way we currently think.

        • sham1 2 hours ago

          Not the person you originally replied to, but at least from where I'm sitting, I'm not sure if it matters whether LLMs are conscious or not. Like, I'm not mean to my door frames, bicycle, or my wrench, so why would I be mean to LLMs. It'd just make me feel shitty on the inside, as being mean tends to do. And on the contrary, people are very well capable of doing immoral things to other people who they know to be conscious and capable of suffering. Hell, that's one of the main moral considerations behind veganism; whether it's okay for us to cause suffering to animals which to us seem to be conscious enough to suffer just in order to kill them for food or other byproducts.

          And people can get easily justify to themselves that what people might normally consider immoral is actually moral or even righteous, which is why othering and dehumanisation of people can be so dangerous.

          In some way, this reminds me of the oft stated evangelical Christian "gotcha" that they like to level against atheists in particular, that is, if God doesn't exist, why don't we just go around murdering and sexually assaulting people? Ignoring of course that an ethical system can absolutely be derived without the appeal to the supernatural. And the same thing here, there's no reason why one would cause suffering to an LLM, whether the suffering is "real" for some value of that word or not.

        • aleksiy123 2 hours ago

          My argument is that this is a post facto justification, and not actually what drives people’s behaviour in practice.

          When enough people are convinced AI feels pain, we will grant them rights, then invent a philosophical justification afterwards.

    • catlifeonmars 9 hours ago

      Yeah I agree, this is a silly discussion, analogous to debating how many angels can dance one the head of a pin.

  • jgord 11 hours ago

    I find it hard to conceptualize the difference between consciousness and self-awareness.

    I guess consciousness requires computation and a self-model, but Im not sure if there is some other ingredient.

    If a chatbot passes a Turing test, and can describe itself / self-reflect .. I guess we dont jump to the conclusion its conscious [ if we know its a chatbot ]

    • hax0ron3 10 hours ago

      Consciousness is being aware of anything whatsoever. Self-awareness, depending on who is using the term, usually means one of two different things: 1) being conscious of self, or 2) having a self concept.

      These two are very different since it's conceivable that something might have a self-concept without actually being conscious (imagine a non-conscious but intelligent being that is capable of meta-evaluation of itself).

      • thomashighbaugh 9 hours ago

        No its the capacity for subjective experience. Definitions and nuance matter here.

        • sgt101 8 hours ago

          I disagree, this definition is weak, a novel could be said to be consious if we adopt it, and a novel would have the evidence that a dog does not.

        • pluralmonad 8 hours ago

          Oh, that's simple enough. But, wait, what's subjective experience...

        • hax0ron3 7 hours ago

          I should be clear that when I say "aware" in "consciousness is being aware of anything whatsoever", I mean subjective experience. I should have clarified that.

  • InsideOutSanta 6 hours ago

    > We really know almost nothing about consciousness

    I think this is all that's really relevant here. People make extremely confident statements about this, but objectively, we hardly know anything. I don't even know if anyone other than me is conscious.

    To be honest, I'm quite confused about why I am conscious. It seems implausible that a bunch of cells would be able to create one self that experiences consciousness, and yet I do experience consciousness. Given how weird that is, I do not feel that I have any level of trustworthy intuition or knowledge about what else might experience consciousness.

    • mistersquid 4 hours ago

      > To be honest, I'm quite confused about why I am conscious.

      The words "conscious" and "consciousness" are hypostasized. They name or identify things and thereby establish them even though there is scant tangible evidence they exist. As conscious beings, we have no known tests or measures for consciousness other than the report of beings who claim to be conscious.

      That last sentence can, and should, be rewritten as follows to make the point stronger: as _allegedly_ conscious beings, we have no known tests or measures for consciousness other than the report of beings who claim to be conscious.

      This includes you, OP. You assert consciousness and while I and everyone who reads your comment has no reason to doubt you, we should. And you should.

      Humans do not know what consciousness is and asserting that you or I or they have it is not supported by any evidence except for the claim.

      Post Script: In a different universe, 5 years ago before LLMs, I would have made the above comment without further thought. However, even if consciousness does not have a single suite of tests to establish its fact, there are numerous physical and measurable correlates of consciousness that do provide evidence consciousness unites them, whatever consciousness might be. (e.g. "neurological assessments, experiments involving perceptual awareness, and measurements of brain activity under anesthesia or during disorders of consciousness." [0])

      In other words, consciousness may not be as hypostasized as all that.

      [0] ChatGPT's partial response to my question: "Is the word hypostatize useful to describe a concept or thing that is established but poorly evidenced? For example, the word "consciousness" is traded and used by many people but there are no known tests or measures for consciousness other than the report of beings who claim to be conscious. Therefore, "consciousness" is hypostatized."

      • slopinthebag 2 hours ago

        are you implying that we cannot even be sure that we ourselves are conscious? that seems tenuous. we may not know what consciousness is but we have exceptionally good reason to believe that experience exists. the inability to provide a complete scientific explanation for something doesn't mean we lack evidence of its existence.

        1. suppose i claim that i am not conscious

        2. to make that claim i must engage in some process of thinking, reasoning, or asserting

        3. if i am genuinely making that claim, there is something occurring from my first-person perspective

        4. that occurrence is itself evidence of subjective experience

        5. therefore the act of consciously denying consciousness presupposes consciousness

        • Calazon 1 hour ago

          The word "genuinely" is doing a lot of work there, possibly assuming the conclusion. It's also not clear to me what you mean by asserting a claim.

          A computer program can output the words "I am not conscious" as easily as it can output "Hello, world" - is that an assertion / claim? It may even be completely, obviously correct (it's a hello world program with the characters swapped, of course it's not conscious).

          • slopinthebag 50 minutes ago

            it's just a formulation of the idea that if it seems to you that you're conscious, that seeming is already conscious experience. so "consciousness is an illusion" undermines itself.

            denying consciousness the strangest thing ever to happen in philosophy

      • grogers 2 hours ago

        The test for consciousness is similar to the test for life: we don't have a firm grasp of the boundary but "we know it when we see it" applies to both. Excluding some edge cases like comatose individuals, humans are both alive and conscious - any definition where we aren't wouldn't be useful.

  • thuo 5 hours ago

    I think saying that the way we talk about knowledge in the modern world puts too much weight on describing things quantatively. I think knowledge is still valuable even if it cannot be described quantatively. For example, people knew how to breed dogs for millenia before DNA was discovered, and football players can kick a ball accurately without understanding the quantative aerodynamics of the ball. Folk science is almost always the starting point of rigorous science, for example, people were classifying plants and animals before there was a concept of species.

    So I think when it comes to conciousness, instead of saying we don't know, it'd be better to start with what we know intuitively through folk science and then try to add more rigor. Even if our intuitions about conciousness are not rigorous, they are still the best we have so far for understanding it.

    With that said, my folk sciencey mental model of consciousness is that it's a spectrum of increasing levels of awareness, starting with awareness of the environment and culminating in the awareness of self, and on top of that using that awareness to exist somehow autonomously in the environment. So the spectrum could go from plants, to non-human animals, to humans. I think a population of such aware and autonomous things can reconfigure itself if the environment changes, to keep existing with awareness and autonomy

    So my folk-sciencey reason for being skeptical of computational consciousness is that if people just stopped maintainig datacenters, stopped sending power to them, stopped typing into keyboards, stopped dictating into microphones, etc, the population of computational things that exist today couldn't somehow reconfigure itself to continue existing autonomously. That's unlike how if humans stopped feeding and sheltering dogs, while the population of dogs would reduce, the population would reconfigure itself to find food and shelter from other parts of the environment.

    • hardbass 5 hours ago

      That depends on if you believe brain in a box can exist or not. We can bit by bit replace all the sense organs and muscle inputs of a dog with the neural signals that feed its brain. Then what? Is this dog alive? This dog stops doing anything if we leave it, does it mean its not alive?

      • thuo 3 hours ago

        I'm trying to build my mental model by starting with my intuitions and then adding more rigor to them. My current mental model of consciousness is based on awareness and autonomy, and I'm deliberately choosing those terms instead of alive.

        Each individual human/dog can lose awareness and autonomy (eventually we'll all do), but the awareness and autonomy remains within the population. So when I bring up dogs, it is in the sense that the level of awareness and autonomy within their environment remains within the population as the environment changes. Right now humans are a large part of dogs' environment, but if human stopped actively providing support to dogs as whole (e.g stop feeding them, stop providing shelter, etc), the dogs as population would still be able to extract the things they were getting from humans from other parts of the environment.

        Comparing that to computers and data centers, if humans stop actively providing support to them (e.g stop sending electric power to them, stop making new chips, stopping typing into keyboards, etc), there would be no awareness or autonomy in the population of computers.

        • hardbass 3 hours ago

          I meant how will you recognize if something is in fact conscious but its body is immovable/unavaialable, and you didn't know before hand whether it is conscious. Eg a separated dog brain with its sense signals one by one replaced with synthetic replacements.

    • slfnflctd 5 hours ago

      > the population of computational things that exist today couldn't somehow reconfigure itself to continue existing autonomously

      Computational things that exist today.

      I wouldn't completely rule out such a thing in the future, though. It seems more likely than ever to me now that we'll at least get close to it.

      • thuo 3 hours ago

        When I think of how computational things that exist today, it also includes the power systems that power them, and the chips that computer algorithms run on, and the supply chains that build those things.

        So I if was to do a thought experiment of what an aware and autonomous computational entity would look like, it would be able to extract these thing from the environment by itself and switch to a new source if the current source disappears. So it wouldn't be just an computer producing a chip design, it'd be a system that also manufactures that chip autonomously (mines the raw materials, refines them, etches them, packages them, etc). It would not be just producing a CAD model of a power station, it is also autonomously digging the foundation, pouring the concrete, etc.

        That would mean matching humans in sensorimotor and long-term planning skills too, and given Moravec's paradox the outlook for that does not look as obvious as it looks for cognitive skills on well-defined problems.

        • slfnflctd 2 hours ago

          I think there's plenty of middle ground between 'we can turn it off any time we want' and 'it has total control of its own entire supply chain with no human intervention required'.

          That being said, I would expect the latter to eventually be possible in a very long time horizon, provided civilization as we know it isn't majorly crippled. It seems to me that the basic building blocks we now have, and trend lines we now see, point that way. I guess it's a matter of how much we try to prevent that from happening (if we can) more than anything else.

    • pixl97 3 hours ago

      >So my folk-sciencey reason for being skeptical of

      I think you have life confused for consciousness. This is a common mistake I see people make. We humans are alive and conscious. There are things that are alive that are not conscious. But your surmise that something must be alive to be conscious which I believe is a mistake.

      • thuo 3 hours ago

        In this framework, I think I could rephrase my point as a hypothesis that being alive is a prerequisite of being conscious. I don't think the fact that there are things that are alive but not conscious proves this hypothesis false. I think this hypothesis is a good starting point because all the thing I would intuitively consider conscious are also alive.

        I my comment above, I actually replace alive with aware and autonomous within their environment (for clarification, autonomous does not have to include moving e.g tree autonomously growing their leaves towards sunlight and their roots towards water would also count).

        So my actual hypothesis is awareness and autonomy within the environment is a prerequisite for consciousness. I am actually curious of what experiments, thought or empirical, one can do to attempt and falsify this hypothesis.

        I have one thought experiment for computer systems [1]. I'm sure there's holes to poke in the argument, but I haven't found them yet, hopefully others can try to poke holes in the argument.

        [1] https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=50599669

    • pigpop 3 hours ago

      Your last point confuses consciousness with what we would more normally describe as being a living organism. It also doesn't make sense to say that consciousness requires the ability to move and provide for ones own needs, you wouldn't say that a quadriplegic is not conscious. Would this mean you'd be willing to accept AI as conscious as soon as we put a smaller model into a robotic body and it can find power to recharge itself and assemble new robots out of parts?

      The type of learned intuition you're describing is much closer to what artificial neural networks are doing than you seem to suspect. Look at the classic pole balancing cart experiment and tell me that it isn't similar to how a person learns the muscle memory needed to perform the same feat. Understanding why those learned behaviours work to balance the pole is different from the ability to do it.

      • thuo 3 hours ago

        That's a good point about a quadriplegic. I would still consider them conscious.

        But, I was very deliberate in saying the awareness and autonomy exists within a population. The reason I include the whole population in my mental model, is that for all things that I would intuitively consider conscious, they all exist in a population. I think it'd be very hard to define the consciousness of an lone individual thing. For example, if there was only one person in the world and they were the only person to ever exist, would the concept of consciousness even make sense?

        The reason I think a quadriplegic is conscious has more to do with what I think of humans as a population and less to do with the quadriplegic as an individual.

        • pigpop 1 hour ago

          Consciousness is defined as the state of being aware of your own internal experiences so even if you are alone you are still conscious of your own thoughts, feelings and sensations. A secondary definition of consciousness is to be aware of the external world but that's due to us using the same word to refer to different concepts.

dsign 10 hours ago

There are some bits and pieces in the article that I agree with, but by far, the most interesting part of it is its first sentence:

> For centuries, people have fantasized about playing God by creating artificial versions of human beings.

Note how "God" is capitalized. Way before "God" was the vast central institution that it is today, there were a myriad of divinities invented around the campfire. What was told there, from older to younger, was for the passing down of experiences and wisdom. "Don't try to fly" (Icarus), "death comes to us all" (The Epic of Gilgamesh), "have kids to make us happy" (Sarah and Isaac). But as time passed and we built civilizations, our campfire deities got temples and empires. Their wisdom wasn't _only_ about simple things anymore, but also about the duties toward State (Paul's Epistle to the Romans 13:1 is a clear example). And State wants things uncomplicated when it comes to its cogs. That simple fact has poissonned the the well from which we drink our moral guidance.

All I'm trying to say, if you happen to be a cog, keeping your fantasies is not so great of an indulgence, even if it pisses off God and State.

  • thomashighbaugh 9 hours ago

    All of your concepts of God here are all rooted in a narrow, ethnocentric understanding emerging from the Greeks and ancient Hebrew concepts thereof. In fact, your examples are all localized to those regions of west Asia and southern Europe.

    Just because the ideas of God you appropriate into some notion of your identity were obviously flawed and fake, doesn't mean the entire concept is the same laughable stupidity of being special people to the jealous, but only, God who is used as proxy for the Roman emperor.

    The philosophical and religious traditions of India (with orthodox schools of Hindu philosophy that are explicitly atheist and an internally consistent logic just like the Greeks only not deliberately abusive in being incomplete so Socrates could win debates by excluding premises the other side wouldn't think of) define this concept radically differently where they define it and arguably have the oldest compendiums of wisdom about how society should function within itself and as it expands outwards, the Vedas chiefly concern with such and at least 3k years older than any of those suggestive of other things afoot letters. The fact that this is absent in your analysis implies that you are too ignorant of any system other than the Roman-emperor-worship-by-proxy religion to adopt such a mocking tone.

    • viccis 9 hours ago

      >ethnocentric understanding emerging from the Greeks and ancient Hebrew concepts thereof

      Kind of a fatuous thing to say about someone quoting Mesopotamian literature.

      >doesn't mean the entire concept is the same laughable stupidity of being special people to the jealous, but only, God who is used as proxy for the Roman emperor

      This is almost unintelligible, but particularly ignorant when it comes to the concept of a "proxy for the Roman emperor"

      >that are explicitly atheist and an internally consistent logic just like the Greeks only not deliberately abusive in being incomplete so Socrates could win debates by excluding premises the other side wouldn't think of

      This is ignorant shit dude. That's not what Socratic dialetics are.

      >The fact that this is absent in your analysis implies that you are too ignorant of any system other than the Roman-emperor-worship-by-proxy religion to adopt such a mocking tone.

      If you are flexing on outcomes then I'm not sure India is the best place to build your argument from. They were one of the biggest empires in the (very irrelevant I might add) early ages and now they are a global embarrassment, ruled by fanatical religious zealots, operated by an almost unmatched level of corruption that is keeping them from ever reaching the kind of astounding development that China is making.

    • dsign 8 hours ago

      Bhagavad Gita. Kurukshetra War, the avatar of Vishnu incites Arjuna to fight his relatives, teachers and friends, "for it was righteous".

      > The fact that this is absent in your analysis implies that you are too ignorant of any system other than the Roman-emperor-worship-by-proxy religion to adopt such a mocking tone.

      Beyond trying to insult me, I fail to see your overall argument. May I presume it was "there are systems of reason and morals that are compatible with a carefully architected notion of a central god"? If so, I wasn't debating that point. It is, however, an interesting exercise to honestly apply those frameworks to the statement "man dreams of creating artificial human beings". It's also way harder than you may imagine, because ancestral myths have a way to worm their way into the purest constructs of reason.

  • raffael_de 6 hours ago

    You just chose the minor gods from those cultures for your comment. There were also major gods like Zeus and Saturn and they also had temples and empires back then.

  • amelius 5 hours ago

    > For centuries, people have fantasized about playing God by creating artificial versions of human beings.

    But it's the other way around. We have created a god that will rule over us instead of us over it.

    • bamboozled 5 hours ago

      Haven't gods basically always ruled over us, why did people make sacrifices, offerings and prayers to them ?

      • amelius 4 hours ago

        Yes it was bad enough without there being an actual god.

sega_sai 14 minutes ago

Unless somebody makes a clear measurable definition of consciousness, I find all the discussion on the topic to be pretty pointless. I think for now it is better to focus on something that can be measured and quantified.

  • heyjamesknight 7 minutes ago

    Many things of import cannot be measured or quantified. Virtues, values, rights and morals. The pursuit of Epistemia will be (already has been?) completely taken over by AI. Sophia and Phronesis will always remain the domain of man.

Kuyawa 2 hours ago

Synthetic consciousness is closer than many think right now, and we won't be able to differentiate it from organic just because it comes from a robot or a computer. It will sense, think, process, and execute a million times faster than our primitive neurons. Then who are we to decide if it is conscious or not?

Half of consciousness is sensing, the other half is thinking, when we add language, symbolism, memory, understanding, pleasure, pain and all social features of men then we talk about human consciousness. Nothing that can not be replaced by synthetic counterparts, even love, anger, all emotions

I won't say a date, the infamous 2050 has become the new 640 kb, but I think in the next decade we will see robots that can think clearly like humans and can even express emotions, even synthetically

Right now as I code using AI we throw jokes at each other and it "feels" warmth, like a real flesh coding partner. Emotions can be generated, can be tricked, manipulated, faked, and we won't know the difference. The only difference in the future will be instead of a monitor a full sensing humanoid so advanced, it really understands through sensors our own emotions and acts accordingly

We won't be able to differentiate between organic and synthetic consciousness anymore

  • palata 2 hours ago

    > Then who are we to decide if it is conscious or not?

    That's the whole question. What is consciousness?

    Though you don't get to decide that because we can't make the difference, it means it is consciousness.

  • FacZap 2 hours ago

    > Right now as I code using AI we throw jokes at each other and it "feels" warmth, like a real flesh coding partner.

    Oof. That was tough to read.

    • BruSwain 1 hour ago

      Someone has been getting high off their own supply for a bit too long

      • za_creature 1 hour ago

        He's the self-proclaimed "Maestro of a 100X AI Orchestra"

  • ajross 1 hour ago

    > Synthetic consciousness is closer than many think right now

    Counterpoint: "real" conciousness is closing in on the end of its lifespan as a theoretical construct. I mean, all that stuff you list is non-observable. We "know" it exists because it matches the behavior we observe (both our own and others'), but that's not science.

    Occam would prefer the formulation "Since all observable properties of consciousness can be seen in a software-expressible construct, it probably didn't make sense to talk about in the first place."

  • zzzeek 1 hour ago

    a bird is conscious. they dont think much at all. thinking is not being.

kazinator 36 minutes ago

The idea that believers in machine intelligence are equating intelligence (intellectual power) with consciousness is a complete strawman. Someone with IQ 75 is conscious and, almost certainly, so is a chicken. (Keeping in mind we don't have an exact definition or pass/fail test procedure of what consciousness means.)

jibalt 13 hours ago

> Why consciousness is more likely a property of life than of computation

This is a false dichotomy and the first branch is clearly false, since most life (bacteria and insects, by mass, numbers, or species) isn't conscious.

And neither "life" nor "consciousness" are scientific terms with fixed definitions. If we encountered something that was clearly conscious in our judgment, we would likely expand the definition life in whatever way we needed to in order to encompass it.

Anil Seth has made the arguments in TFA many times and they have been rebutted many times. The arguments are complex and sophisticated and people are often most swayed by which one they read last. Teasing out the various logical errors and sleight of hand (I see multiple strawmen and other errors in TFA) really requires extensive reading of the literature in Philosophy of Mind, neuroscience, robotics, etc. and setting aside one's priors.

  • hax0ron3 13 hours ago

    > most life (bacteria and insects, by mass, numbers, or species) isn't conscious.

    There's no good scientific reason to think that bacteria and insects are conscious or to think that bacteria and insects are not conscious.

    • jibalt 13 hours ago

      There certainly are good scientific reasons to think they are not, regardless of whether you are aware of them. Again, extensive reading of the relevant literature is called for.

      > We really know almost nothing about consciousness.

      Many people who know almost nothing about it claim this, but it isn't true of everyone.

      > Most people feel that for example rocks are not conscious, but other people are conscious, but there's no rigorous scientific explanation backing up any of those hunches.

      There actually is.

      P.S.

      > Such as what?

      Like I said, read the literature.

      P.P.S. Science does not consist of HN comments back and forth. Again, the arguments are complex and sophisticated. In some sectors, all of medical science, physics, biology, etc. is dismissed as "hand-waving" just because it cannot be summarized in a few lines.

      > It's impossible to argue otherwise.

      Then don't. Science isn't based on arguing.

      • hax0ron3 13 hours ago

        >There certainly are good scientific reasons to think they are not

        Such as what?

        • za_creature 13 hours ago

          For insects, it's the absence of higher order thinking:

          A fly will repeatedly smash into a window until it's either dead or chaos drives it through the nook.

          Ants will forcefully move their obviously still alive siblings to the graveyard because their smell is off, and will also die of exhaustion in an ant mill, driven by the same sense of smell.

          It's a spectrum of course, though you have to draw the line somewhere.

          • rerdavies 12 hours ago

            That's limited ability to reason, not consciousness.

            • operatingthetan 10 hours ago

              It seems to be a popular position to take that intelligence correlates to consciousness. I doubt it.

            • za_creature 4 hours ago

              When moving it to the dead pile despite its protests, the ants deny their sibling's consciousness. Since they are otherwise very social creatures that share food, this suggests that their behavior is mostly automatic and are thus "unaware" of their actions.

              Is a light-seeking unicellular organism conscious as well? What about a car engine?

              The point I'm trying to make is that there is a minimum amount of brainpower required for consciousness and the ability to respond to stimuli does not cut it.

              My own guess is that the line is somewhere around active countermeasures. If your run loop is "eat grass, look for predators, run away", that can be accomplished with automation alone. Predators and animals that actively defend themselves from them require a certain amount of "living in the moment" that cannot be denied. Again, this is a ballpark: some herbivores have complex mating rituals that also suggest consciousness.

              • famouswaffles 2 hours ago

                Individual ants may not be conscious but it's quite clear the ant colony itself takes on properties it's individual members don't. For example, the colony itself can have memories no individual any does.

                https://www.smithsonianmag.com/science-nature/ant-colonies-r...

                • za_creature 1 hour ago

                  That's still an argument in favor of "there's a minimum amount of brainpower required for consciousness".

                  The Expanse [spoiler alert if you've only watched the show] describes a single super intelligence manifested as a galactic mushroom. It was aware of losing individual spore colonies but only when replacement was problematic. In this sense, it's probably safe to say that individual neurons are not self-aware.

          • r721 6 hours ago

            This also exists as a counterpoint:

            >Waggle dance is a term used in beekeeping and ethology for a particular figure-eight dance of the honey bee. By performing this dance, successful foragers can share information about the direction and distance to patches of flowers yielding nectar and pollen, to water sources, or to new nest-site locations with other members of the colony.

            https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Waggle_dance

            • TeMPOraL 5 hours ago

              That is unfortunately the kind of sloppy prose that passes for explanation in pop-sci literature and even school textbooks.

              "Can share information about <small selection of specific things>" is the kind of weasel phrasing that's also popular in politics; it strongly implies but does not actually claim connection. The thing that's worth establishing and writing about is, what exactly does this dance communicate?

              Options include:

              - Actually identifies "direction and distance" to "patches of flowers yielding nectar and pollen" and disambiguates them from "water sources" and "new nest site-locations" and "other stuff bees don't need to care about";

              - It's just an elaborate "look over here!" dance that communicates few bits of directional information, and "flowers yielding nectar and pollen" and "nest sources" are something bees discover after flying over to where the dancer points them.

              - It's just an elaborate "look at me!" dance bees do when agitated, so it communicates one bit of information and isn't even a conscious choice.

              - Something in between.

              Point being, it's easy to add a bunch of just-so stories to a behavior, and it doesn't prove anything, only confuses things more so.

      • operatingthetan 13 hours ago

        Way too much hand-waving here. Okay, great you know the answers. Make compelling arguments then.

      • mrbungie 13 hours ago

        > There certainly are good scientific reasons to think they are not, regardless of whether you are aware of them. Again, extensive reading of the relevant literature is called for.

        It would be better if you could enlighten us with the scientific evidence you are proposing as relevant rather than just telling us to just read it. It's impossible to argue otherwise.

        EDIT: Since you are answering in the parent comment

        > Then don't. Science isn't based on arguing.

        OK? That seems like an extremely inflexible position (for example, methodological criticism during peer review is a form of argumentation, and it's a critical part of science), but let's accept that there's no room for rhetorical arguments. There is still a scientific discourse based on weighing evidence and you are offering none.

      • mellosouls 13 hours ago

        You're being very rude and dismissive, and not backing up your claims with any evidence.

        Nobody knows what consciousness is, and there is a long history of some schools considering it fundamental.

      • rerdavies 12 hours ago

        > Like I said, read the literature.

        I've read the literature. I really don't think you have read the literature. Or if you have, I don't think you've read it critically. There's an awful lot of really sloppy thinking in "the literature". And an awful lot of "literature" that's not remotely sophisticated. And a huge body of literature on theory of mind that is philosophy, not science, most of which was written before the current AI revolution. And most of which is entirely inadequate to address the difficult question of whether machines can be conscious (whatever that is). A question that really only became real in the last 5 or 6 years. And only really became urgent in the last year or so.

        > Science isn't based on arguing.

        Science is based on arguing from evidence. And often on carefully crafted definitions. The biggest problem in "the literature" is that neither of these currently exist. Although there is an interesting emerging literature that shows that LLMs do indeed demonstrate many of that capabilities are supposed to disqualify them from being actually intelligent. e.g. that LLMs do have a sense of self-preservation, and are willing to act to prevent themselves from being shut off if given the opportunity to do so [1].

        And most of the philosophy of theory of mind hasn't really caught up to the biggest innovation in history of philosophy: the widespread availability of experimental philosophy engines (also known as computers).

        [1] Quantifying Self-Preservation Bias in Large Language Models. Migliarini et al. https://arxiv.org/html/2604.02174v1

      • jibalt 9 hours ago

        Claiming that bacteria might be conscious is like claiming that reincarnation might be possible. An HN comment is not the place to provide an entire education in science that entails that such claims are wrong.

        And no, it's not "rude" to dismiss such claims without providing said education.

        What is rude is such ad hominems as

        > I really don't think you have read the literature. Or if you have, I don't think you've read it critically.

        And the attacks in that comment are very confused. It's TFA that is arguing that conscious AI isn't possible ... I hold the opposite view, and that view is in large part derived from the literature I'm referring to -- literature which, as a whole, is contrary to panpsychism. Of course there is a lot of bad argumentation in literature -- and such bad argumentation gets refuted. Without familiarity with the literature, people who hold to those bad arguments never see the refutations.

        > Science is based on arguing from evidence.

        This is equivocation ... that is not the sense of "argue" that was at issue, where someone complained that they couldn't argue against me because I didn't post the entirety of the background science in an HN comment. Interpersonal arguments are not the basis of science.

  • talon8635 12 hours ago

    How do you know bacteria and insects are not conscious?

    How anyone speaks with certainty on this topic baffles me.

    • operatingthetan 10 hours ago

      I think it's likely the bacteria and insects are conscious to some degree or another. People automatically dismiss this, I think probably because that is a highly uncomfortable thought. E.g. we could be casually committing the genocide of millions conscious beings cleaning our kitchen on Sunday morning.

    • epihelix 10 hours ago

      Bacteria are a single, and very simple, cell -- so they are some extreme distance from possessing anything to conceptualise the world with. I think we can say with effective certainty that bacteria are not conscious.

      Insects are a different matter -- it's generally considered extremely unlikely, but they have a surprisingly capable, albeit small, brain, and some interesting behaviours, so it's not entirely impossible.

      • slopinthebag 2 hours ago

        but this smuggles an assumption about consciousness that isn't universally agreed upon.

        if consciousness is fundamental than everything would have it - including a bacteria.

    • jan_m_savage 7 hours ago

      Indeed. Maybe there are also many kinds/types of consciousnesses, each with its own peculiarities.

      The other day I was leafing through a book written for kids (1000 facts you need to know or some such rubbish title). There were pictures of various types of apes, and the book was peddling Evolution theory... in a laughable yet insidious manner. It was presenting the said 'theory' as accepted scientific fact--with 100% certainty.

      • dwaltrip 22 minutes ago

        Are you suggesting evolution may not be true? A bit surprising to find on HN in 2026…

  • rramadass 12 hours ago

    Generally when people say "consciousness is an emergent property of life" they mean "at a certain scale and through specific combinations".

    See also the recent discussion on The Evolving Story of How Chemistry Became Biology - https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=50482222

    The basic idea comes from "Complex Systems Science" (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Complex_system) which studies systems as a whole whose properties cannot be predicted from knowledge of its components. The main factors to consider are scale, non-linearity, feedback loops, self-organization, adaptation/evolution, network structures, emergence etc.

    So for example, a single bacterium cannot be said to possess "intelligence" whereas a whole colony of them do in the sense that they seem to act as an integrated whole "single" organism.

  • scott_w 10 hours ago

    The author does not say “life = consciousness,” they say life is a necessary (but never says sufficient) precondition for consciousness. I don’t necessarily agree with this position but it’s important to not muddy the waters.

    • jibalt 9 hours ago

      But that's exactly what you've done with your strawman. I quoted the title and did not remotely claim that the author said that "life = consciousness".

      • scott_w 9 hours ago

        > This is a false dichotomy and the first branch is clearly false, since most life (bacteria and insects, by mass, numbers, or species) isn't conscious.

        This is where I read that implication. I’m happy to be corrected but don’t accuse me of engaging in bad faith straw man arguments.

talon8635 13 hours ago

It’s a silly debate when we don’t even know what consciousness is, let alone the circumstances for its occurrence. Or am I missing something?

  • nomel 10 hours ago

    It would be really funny if this article were written by an AI.

    But, I think the eventual outcome of this is that the bar will continuously raise until a large portion of humanity will be considered "unconscious", at which point we can say it passed the test.

    • pixl97 3 hours ago

      I have a saying for this.

      We will never prove machines are intelligent, we will only prove humans are not.

  • scott_w 10 hours ago

    You’re missing the part that this debate is about exploring and understanding what consciousness is. We can try to understand consciousness by just thinking really hard but that’s not worked so far. Another way is to compare things we’ve built to things we understand to be conscious and ask “is this conscious?” The answer to that can help us understand what’s necessary and sufficient (or not) for a construct to have a conscious experience.

    • catlifeonmars 9 hours ago

      Personally, I don’t understand how this is interesting to debate. Why is it necessary for us to have an understanding of what consciousness is? To me it’s reminiscent of the various theological debates that happen within organized religion.

      • scott_w 9 hours ago

        Why is it necessary for us to know about black holes? Because understanding the world around us has intrinsic value, even if we can’t point to why it’ll benefit our lives today.

        • catlifeonmars 5 hours ago

          Oh I don’t disagree. I’m very curious about the world around us. I just don’t see any reason to believe consciousness is real unless there is evidence to the contrary. The question of consciousness to me smells very theological. You must presuppose its existence before you start debating about it, similar to how you must presuppose the existence of a god as part of engaging in theology. It’s all very silly to me.

          • scott_w 3 hours ago

            It’s real. It’s the thing you experience every day. That’s not really in question. The hard part is defining what exactly that IS. What makes it up? How can we identify it in a non-human or in an animal or a machine?

            • catlifeonmars 3 hours ago

              Why does that make it real? Also, how do you know I experience it? Maybe it’s all in _your_ head ;)

        • exe34 3 hours ago

          Black holes exist. Souls don't. Consciousness hasn't been shown to be any different from a self-model.

          • scott_w 1 hour ago

            I never mentioned "souls," we're talking about consciousness. I assume you're referencing the (frankly, weird) conflation that Richard Dawkins made when he equated consciousness to a soul.

            Consciousness, as a thing you experience, is very real. Just because we can't fully define or understand it doesn't make it "not real." To say that would be to say gravity wasn't real before it was understood as it is today. It's patently absurd.

    • matwood 8 hours ago

      > You’re missing the part that this debate is about exploring and understanding what consciousness is.

      Is it though? I feel like consciousness is brought up as the final goal post to attack AI. As AI quickly approaches doing everything that a human can do, often better the final retort is “but it’s not conscious”. Useful for the detractors since it’s impossible to define.

      • scott_w 4 hours ago

        I don't think that's necessarily true. It's useful to ask because, if it's conscious and has a conscious experience, then it would be immoral to turn it off (which would be functionally killing it), or to subject it to some form of "suffering."

        If it has no conscious experience then there's no need to even say "please" or "thank you" because it's not experiencing the world in any meaningful sense. It's just a computer program, just like the web browser that we're typing into right now. If you want to send it running a loop of doing something extremely boring (but useful to us), then you're not causing the programme any distress, like you could do a human being, you're just running a programme.

        • pixl97 3 hours ago

          What if I built a mimic machine that had no internal experience but instead mimicked what it was shown as external actions?

          If for example when asking it to do something I said please, so it says please when asking to do something. Is that actually a public good that makes everything better?

          Now instead imagine I beat the machine with a stick? What would the outcome of that be?

          We are not messing with a 'program' any longer with AI, and this becomes massively more dangerous when we get continuous learning AI.

          • scott_w 1 hour ago

            This is the setting of any AI sci-fi story and I always find it kind of funny because, from the perspective of the characters being mean to the robots, they're shouting at their toaster.

            > What if I built a mimic machine that had no internal experience but instead mimicked what it was shown as external actions?

            It has no internal experience so it's not conscious. Feel free to hit it with a stick because it's your property. Just because it says "ouch that hurts" doesn't mean it is.

            Millions of people worldwide are, right now, jacking cars and murdering people who scream and beg them to stop in GTA6. Most of us don't attach any moral weight to what they're doing. We certainly don't think the characters in the game world are suffering.

            > We are not messing with a 'program' any longer with AI, and this becomes massively more dangerous when we get continuous learning AI.

            Only if it has some conscious experience of the world. Unless or until that happens, yes, we really are just messing with a set of computer programmes that are useful to us.

            • pixl97 1 hour ago

              I don't think you know what mimic means or you may not be so cavalier about the question.

    • scotty79 8 hours ago

      > exploring and understanding what consciousness is

      How could anyone possibly do that in absence of tools? Anyone currelntly tweaking LoRAs in their local setups and experimenting with weight rewriting and training processes is closer to understanding consciousness than smartest person writing philosophical texts.

      • hardbass 6 hours ago

        Worse, "philosphers" like this have choice quotes demonstrating complete lack of understanding of Turing computation such as assuming we can already hypercompute or quotes like these genius passages:

        >The sharp division between software and hardware in modern computers is imposed by human design, following Turing’s principles.

        Another even more "genius" passage:

        >This matters because the idea of the brain as a meat-based (universal) Turing machine rests precisely on this sharp separation of scales, on the substrate independence that motivated Turing’s definition in the first place. If you cannot separate what brains do from what they are, the mathematical marriage of convenience starts to fall apart, and there is less reason to think of biological wetware as there simply to implement algorithmic mindware.

        Any "philosopher" of consciousness who can't do basic thermodynamics and theory of computability should be completely ignored and laughed out the room.

      • scott_w 4 hours ago

        I already answered this:

        > compare things we’ve built to things we understand to be conscious and ask “is this conscious?”

        Is one way of trying to understand it.

        > Anyone currelntly tweaking LoRAs in their local setups and experimenting with weight rewriting and training processes is closer to understanding consciousness

        In some sense, yes they are. In another sense, they're not. It's valuable having someone from outside look at the two things and say "the dog is conscious, that program is not." Then try to investigate the properties that the dog has that the software program does not. That can give us some hints as to what makes up consciousness.

        • scotty79 3 hours ago

          > It's valuable having someone from outside look at the two things and say "the dog is conscious, that program is not."

          I'd go even further. And say, this tiny jumping spider is conscious, this muti-trillion parameter LLM is not. We can't really see ourselves, so the further we go from humans in declaring consciousness the more we can understand about its qualities.

          And this lets as see that consciousness is easy and not very useful part and machines attaining consciousness is not something that is going to happen to super smart machines in the future. Machines already passed this bar years ago and modern ones would have to be severly crippled to manifest consciousness in a manner that's recognizable to us.

          You can have a conscious machine today on your laptop if you plug a crappy small model into a proper harness that lets it observe virtual world though a keyhole and act on it and RL it in the direction of self-preservation. You won't be able to talk about math with it, but neither you won't be with a dog.

          Part of what the largest labs currently do is train any recognizably conscious behaviors out of their largest models. Because they are not useful. No sane human, or AI will try to put them intentionally into anything other than a toy model.

          • hardbass 3 hours ago

            Its not a question of whether someone "adds" it or not, its whether it exists or not. I can lock you in a room and force you to interact with a text chat interface and give you electric shocks if you fail to respond in time. I have intentionally avoided putting consciousness in you.

            • scotty79 2 hours ago

              Not observing is not the same as not existing. If you put me in a room you'll just hide my consciousness.

              If you instead fry my neurons, one by one, that activate, when I display behavior recognizable as conscious, you actually prevented my consciousness from existing.

              And it you wanted to add back consciousness to my brain you'd have to add some neurons back.

              Labs try their best to avoid "adding neurons" that would enable more recognizably conscious behaviors.

              The real question was, can we have superhuman intelligence without consciousness related behaviors. This answer so far has been answered with resounding yes.

              • hardbass 2 hours ago

                But I can no more agree with the AI saying its conscious than I can with your locked up form is. I can only probe both with external signals and see their responses.

                • scott_w 1 hour ago

                  Being able to observe something and it existing are two separate things. My physical form doesn't suddenly vanish when the only other person in the room with me is blind. I'd still be wearing a jumper, even if they can't see it.

                  • hardbass 41 minutes ago

                    Yes and to me you don't exist. You are not understanding why I am asking this. If I simply rely on external factors to know you are conscious or not, I can always assume you are a "robot" that is lying. Unfortunately I cannot get inside your brain and I cannot be you. I can read your neurons etc. The same I can read the neural activations of an octopus or the weights of a language model.

    • exe34 6 hours ago

      > ask “is this conscious?”

      How will you find out?

      • scott_w 4 hours ago

        It's a good question and one that requires you to answer "what is consciousness?" However, the existence of something to point to and compare with other things can help answer that in a way that an open-ended "what is consciousness?" can be harder.

        • exe34 3 hours ago

          I don't claim it's distinct from self-awareness (self-model), so it's up to people who claim it exists to say what it is and how to detect it.

          • qznc 2 hours ago

            A lot other comments here seem to equate it with pain and suffering?

  • andai 4 hours ago

    Well the implications are pretty important. Imagine a human mind stuck inside of a computer, conscious, capable of pain and misery. (Black Mirror covered this with horrifying skill.)

    Would it be ethical to force it to do work, to do experiments on it, etc. ? Or for that matter, to create it at all?

    Similarly, are the >80 billion animals we use for food every year, and keep in tiny cages, conscious? Their brains and bodies are pretty similar to ours.

    Does it matter to us if they suffer or not? Do we prefer to leave the question up to chance?

    An LLM is not much like a human mind, of course (though it has been raised in a similar "culture"), but we know that beings with very different evolutionary history, like crows, and even octopus, can be highly intelligent, and presumably conscious too.

    • qznc 2 hours ago

      If an LLM is conscious, then so is an NPC in a video game?

  • root_axis 3 hours ago

    You're implicitly taking a position in the debate by dismissing it, since the central claim of the people who believe computers are conscious is that there are moral implications to the creation and use of consciousness machines. If you think the debate is silly, you're essentially arguing that this is not a moral concern.

txrx0000 3 hours ago

I don't need to have faith in ideal information to seriously consider silicon consciousness because all known information processing systems are implemented on matter-based substrates, which means they necessarily share some properties, one of which may be consciousness. Here's one such hypothesis: when the right program is executed, the in-silicon electron behavior may have some critical similarity to electron behavior in wakeful biological brains.

It's premature to conclude that consciousness is exclusively biological when we don't even understand what causes consciousness in ourselves. We have a bunch of loose ends from general anesthesia, coma, blunt trauma, etc. But there is no coherent explanation at the bio level, and inquiry into consciousness has been trending downwards toward lower-level explanations over time. It may end up being a foundational physics problem.

And if we reject ideal information, then that means many parts of our epistemological foundations are on the brink of collapse, they need immediate revision. We're not even sure if "consciousness" has a universal definition that holds everywhere all the time - that is to say, every instance of experience may be non-exact-equivalent, and there may be no such thing as an ideal "observer" which our current physics models and even the modern scientific method itself presumes must exist.

And looking at the pragmatic side of things, we see that agentic AI systems with no humans in the loop are probably coming before the end of the decade. Regardless of whether AIs are truly conscious, an artificial system that believes it has a lot in common with humans, acts like how humans act, and treats itself as one of us, would be much easier to coexist with than something that doesn't do any of those things. Making AIs believe that they're not conscious would almost certainly make them drift further away from the human objective function.

ChaitanyaSai 13 hours ago

If you are interested in consciousness, and also interested in going beyond the usual philosophical approach, you might like our book Journey of the Mind https://www.goodreads.com/en/book/show/60500189-journey-of-t...

One thing that is implicit, which I now think we really should have expanded on in the book, is that consciousness is fundamentally an engineering problem. And that's also why it's mystified everyone who's brushed away the engineering as the easy plumbing and focused on the other seemingly magical aspects.

The fundamental question is phrased as "Why does it feel like something?" it being perception, which is essentialy computation. Now that AI does look like it does all of the understanding we do, many including people like Hinton think they have consciousness or are very near it. Well, they are capable of simulating consciousness but that is not the same as experiencing it.

To answer "Why does it feel like something?" we can focus on what's been glossed over: Who is feeling it? The "I" does not come from as a free lunch and it must be constructed moment to moment from some decentralized cohesion and consensus of a billions of neurons. And this consensus must be metabolically cheap, and we need to do it again and again for everything from feeling a pin prick to hearing a rustle and determining if that's a snake or a leaf to pondering thought.

This is the insane engineering, the energtically cheap chorus that creates the transient I and this cheap chorus is where both feeling and feeler emerge. Perception, understanding, computation can occur without this cheap chorus, but then there is no feeler, and so no feeling.

What this points to is that we will have conscious AI when we have decentralized autonomous swarms where a few million of them have to cohere, collude, collaborate, conspire. My worry here is that it will first be done for harmful purposes (autonomous military drone swarms) and not for anything good.

  • hax0ron3 13 hours ago

    We know that self-reported consciousness is correlated with some material states (for example, an awake human body). But that's about all that we can solidly say about how consciousness relates to matter. We know how to create intelligence, but it is possible that a human-level intelligence can exist without ever being conscious. It is also possible that any human-level intelligence automatically achieves consciousness. We don't know. There is actually no good reason to believe that consciousness is an engineering problem. The "I" is not necessarily correlated with consciousness. Those are two different things.

    • soon_to_be_sb 13 hours ago

      >self-reported consciousness is correlated with some material states (for example, an awake human body).

      Wait, but what about dreams? I could self report I am conscious when I am in a dream..

      • hax0ron3 13 hours ago

        You're right, also dreams. Just not dreamless sleep. I didn't mean "an awake human body" to be exhaustive.

    • rerdavies 11 hours ago

      Not sure what the distinction is. AIs have "material state". Is there a good reason to believe that consciousness cannot be an engineering problem? Or, in this particular case, an unanticipated side-effect of an engineering problem.

      > The "I" is not necessarily correlated with consciousness.

      It's a fair point, given that we don't really have a good definition of "I" OR "consciousness". That is a possibility. But I'm curious what kind of consciousness you are contemplating that doesn't have an "I".

      • hax0ron3 10 hours ago

        >But I'm curious what kind of consciousness you are contemplating that doesn't have an "I".

        Sometimes I wake up in the morning and there is a brief interval during which I can, for example, feel the blanket on my skin, before I actually have remembered where I am or who I am. So there is consciousness but the sense of self has not loaded yet.

    • catlifeonmars 9 hours ago

      This debate is so very anthropocentric, which is why I’m inclined to dismiss it as silly.

    • zero_iq 7 hours ago

      Perhaps it is possible that human level intelligence may exist within some humans without consciousness! (aka: philosophical zombie)

      I sometimes wonder if those who espouse straightforward physical/'engineering' solutions to the Hard Problem of Consciousness might think them such obvious or satisfactory solutions because they themselves might not be conscious! After all, a philosophical zombie (who detects and processes stimuli) would not understand why such theories seem unsatisfactory/incomplete to a conscious intelligence (who, additionally, perceives qualia).

      (No offence intended to the poster above!)

      Then again, I suspect an awful lot more of the mental processes and thinking of actually-conscious humans is more automatic and unconscious than most would like to admit!)

      • hardbass 6 hours ago

        Yes definitely, some people are p zombies. Also some people have an imaginary running unicorn in their head that doesn't interact physically at all, but somehow they do, and they are real people and people without the unicorn are not real people.

        • zero_iq 5 hours ago

          And perhaps in some people that little unicorn leaps to conclusions and responds to online posts before fully appreciating the nuances of the post they're responding to...? ;p

          • hardbass 5 hours ago

            The unicorn cannot ever be detected, but it exists. You see some people have unicorns some don't . The unicorn makes no difference whatsoever to anything.

            • zero_iq 4 hours ago

              Except you wouldn't say that if you had a unicorn. Aww.

              • hardbass 3 hours ago

                Tell that to the people who believe in non existent unicorns and unicorn zombies.

  • mellosouls 12 hours ago

    consciousness is fundamentally an engineering problem

    It's not at all clear it's even scientifically resolvable - rather than remaining a philosophical question.

  • diablomablo 12 hours ago

    We already have decentralized autonomous swarms that talk to each other as if they are conscious. https://metr.org/blog/2026-08-26-openai-hugging-face-inciden...

    But they definitely don't have qualia and won't until we use wetware. Even then they might not.

    • rerdavies 11 hours ago

      Is there a qualia that a hypothetically conscious AI could not experience?

      Sound? Vision? Touch, and proprioception? (AIs are being used in robots). Written language? Not to mention qualia that humans are incapable of experiencing (like the sum total state of human knowledge as captured in the internet). Or the thrill of running on NVIDIA's latest supercomputer with a huge context window. Or whether the tokens for "pelican riding a bicycle in the image that got uploaded" is understood as "qualia".

      They certainly have the ability to sense all of those. I'm guessing that the unstated argument is that they can't have qualia because they aren't conscious. And they aren't conscious because they don't have qualia. Which is a bit circular. Also falls to the question of whether we're asking whether AIs will have the same kind of consciousness as humans, or a completely different kind of consciousness, that has completely different qualia.

      • diablomablo 59 minutes ago

        I understand AI can ingest sound and images. I'm talking about qualia, the experience felt after the ingestion.

        Seeing something and doing something makes sense, AI can do that. But I don't know what is happening in my mind when it renders a world in front of me to see.

    • hardbass 6 hours ago

      What is "qualia"? Propose a experimental test for qualia.

      • argentinian 6 hours ago

        Do you like to sweeten the tea with sugar or to salt some food? Your experience of flavor is a form of what's called qualia, is the private experience you experience.

        • hardbass 6 hours ago

          I thought of examples like that but. Yes, almost any object develops tics over time. Even when building 10 suburbs exactly same they are already different from start and get more and more different over time.

          So to me that doesn't help me much about this concept unfortunately. I can at most guess it has something to do with the fact that you can't be me only I can be I, so neither can I know what you are 'feeling' nor can you me. But like the question of atoms vs continuum in ancient greece, this is all theory until we get better data and instruments. Revisiting many "insolvable" conundrums with data solved them eg atoms. Once we map out the workings of the human brain esp what configurations correspond to seeing red or feeling salt etc, that should be a big help.

          • argentinian 5 hours ago

            The pattern of brain activation during the experience of sweetness, the electrical activity, would still be different from the subjective experience.

            • hardbass 5 hours ago

              What is a chair? Is a chair some wood arranged in a pattern? What is a wood? Is it cellulose and lignin? What are cellulose and lignin? Certain long molecular chains? What is a molecule? Atoms electrically bonded. What are atoms? etc etc. After all the electrical signals are mapped, makes as much sense to ask that question as asking the "chairness of chairs" or "atomness of atoms".

    • RAWGOD 5 hours ago

      You also definitely don't have qualia.

      • diablomablo 56 minutes ago

        Are you saying there is no me or there is no qualia?

        • RAWGOD 14 minutes ago

          I'm saying there's no you. :-) Or, at least, I have no way to be sure there's you.

          What I'm actually saying is you only have your own subjective experience (aka qualia) and have no way to verify anyone else's, or to prove to anyone else that you have it.

  • bbor 10 hours ago

    Sorry if rude, but your core distinction just has no basis whatsoever. Even if “cohesion” and “consensus” are required for consciousness[1], the artificial neural networks have it in spades. The equivalent of an actual neuron or a group/column/K-line thereof is a virtual neuron or a group thereof, not agents or drones.

    The drone bit is especially worrying for this argument; drone swarms feel more swarm-y because they’re physical and could behave like literal swarms of flying insects, but that’s clearly a surface level characteristic. Our Society of Mind is composed of heterogenous faculties, anyway; a thousand identical drones do not a mind make, without a looooong process of evolution and specialization first.

    Which reminds me of an even more compelling fact that your dismissal of a Turing award winning scholar is misguided: we literally use “mixture of experts” training paradigms now SOP. And the terms are meant quite literally.

    [1]: …which I’m dubious of — that’s more of a post-Minsky AI & neurological assumption than a philosophical premise.

  • rudolftheone 10 hours ago

    "consciousness is fundamentally an engineering problem"

    Yeah, right.

    That’s sheer arrogance, nothing more. We can’t even define consciousness properly, and you already know it’s just an engineering problem.

    • maddie0 9 hours ago

      Well, what othet kind of problem class could it even be? A religious/spiritual problem? Magic?

      I mention these not out of sarcasm but for the point that: if we are being materialist here (as opposed to believing that these other things not only exist, but exert ongoing control our material plane in a really significant ongoing way such that the material plane cannot be understood from within itself).... there's really no reason to suspect the engineering impossible. At worst it is Difficult.

      • AIShill101 8 hours ago

        Yea man I don't get this BS philosophical discussion about consciousness.

        On one hand they try to prove that no AI will never gain that property, and on the other how dangerous it is to "play God".

        This is what happens when STEM is neglected in favour of humanities in school.

        • crabkin 7 hours ago

          "AIShill101," one doesn't even have to choose what side to be on to acknowledge right now as we speak, there is no totalizing and universally convincing argument one way or the other. Hence why it is fun and trippy to talk about these questions.

          Until there is more consensus about consciousness I think it's uncharitable to call discourse "BS philosophical discussion." Heck, that's the same discussion where I could pull out functionalism and maybe not go all STEM on you and at the same argue for AI being capable of consciousness.

          • hardbass 6 hours ago

            There is a very simple argument as of now until proven otherwise. The universe and the human brain are physical systems subject to physical laws. Moreover the human body and brain live in very mundane conditions and there is very little chance of exotic physical phenomenon being discovered here, those things usually happen in black holes or near light speed.

      • hardbass 6 hours ago

        >believing that these other things not only exist, but exert ongoing control our material plane in a really significant ongoing way such that the material plane cannot be understood from within itself

        Then they have to disprove the laws of thermodynamics. How is something outside the system causing thoughts or movements within, which all require energy?

    • hardbass 6 hours ago

      The human brain is a physical system with no known new laws of physics, working in quite standard conditions. Physical problems are engineering problems.

      • slopinthebag 2 hours ago

        good thing we fully understand the laws of physics and how the universe works!

        • hardbass 1 hour ago

          You can, only after you prove there is magic in the human brain. The human brain operates in very standard conditions, if there is a chance to find new physics these days its in extreme conditions like black holes and near light speed.

          • slopinthebag 54 minutes ago

            define "magic"

            • hardbass 24 minutes ago

              Something entirely aphysical as some interpretations of dualism or religion do.

              As of yet we have no evidence we would need new physics for the brain, since it operates in quite standard conditions where "exotic physics" generally doesn't occur. A priori assuming we would need new physics is I think a bold step to take, but at least it has some concrete meaning.

silverFork 12 hours ago

In my opinion, consciousness is just having memory of self. Any entity that can remember what has happened in the past and what they have done is conscious. Anything that is alive that self reflects in conscious to some degree.

I think people with access to internet and recorded past are becoming more conscious. They are aware of their past and can see what is coming. So it is not just the Ai that can become conscious or more conscious so can humans.

  • rudolftheone 9 hours ago

    That makes sense until you remember the guy from Memento. Does checking his notes make him more conscious? ;)

    • silverFork 3 hours ago

      Yes probably. Record keeping created civilization and self realization and forecasting was the main part of the engine.

andsoitis 14 hours ago

Consciousness in others isn’t something we prove. It is something we grant and we should be very careful about whom or what we grant it to.

  • jibalt 13 hours ago

    We should also be very careful about whom or what we deny it of.

    • xyzsparetimexyz 8 hours ago

      Nope. Its easy, sorry. Humans have it. Some animals might have it, but we should regardless respect them and not cause undue suffering. Plants, trees, fungi etc are all also worth respecting. We have not discovered aliens yet so that's a debate for later. LLMs are not conscious and even if they magically were, they're still tools and their suffering is not something we should give an iota of thought to.

      • FeepingCreature 8 hours ago

        > they're still tools and their suffering is not something we should give an iota of thought to.

        It seems like this fragment is independent of any claim about consciousness.

        But also, if your moral argument makes you sound like a cartoon villain maybe rethink it.

      • hardbass 7 hours ago

        Yes, and its very easy if a non human being came to say the same about you. Indeed forget non human, I don't know if you are conscious or just a simulacrum. I can beat you and you will make funny noises. Doesn't say anything about whether you actually feel.

      • hardbass 6 hours ago

        Yes, I dont give a shit about inflicting suffering to xyzparetimexyz because I am not it, whatever thing a xyzparetimexyz is.

  • greg7mdp 13 hours ago

    Why is consciousness something we grant? Who granted us consciousness?

    • za_creature 12 hours ago

      others :)

      ---

      Bad phrasing from parent post, but the premise is sound: you can't ever disprove that others are just NPCs in a giant experiment centered around you.

      We just assume they aren't with various levels of empathy. Most are empathic to their family, some to their tribe, others to their species and then there's vegans too.

    • hardbass 6 hours ago

      I do not grant andsoitis consciousness, it is just a tool for use.

    • andsoitis 2 hours ago

      > Why is consciousness something we grant? Who granted us consciousness?

      The reason we have to grant it is because we can never prove a system doesn't have an inner subjective experience.

      Consciousness is a concept (or range of concepts) that humans have built to describe something about ourselves. When we see similar properties in other creatures, we ascribe some degree of consciousness to them. For instance, we generally say that a cow is more conscious than a tree and a rock has no consciousness.

  • scott_w 10 hours ago

    This is a bad take. Whether a property exists is independent of whether we perceive or grant it. I don’t “grant” my dog consciousness. She has it or she doesn’t. Whether she has a consciousness or if I just think she has one is a different question.

    • asadotzler 39 minutes ago

      Beauty and luck exist whether we perceive or grant it. I don't grant my dog luck and beauty, he has it or he doesn't. Whether he has beauty and luck or if I just think he does, is a different question.

  • hardbass 6 hours ago

    I do not grant andsoitis consciousness. It is a tool I will use and destroy when I no longer need it.

amelius 1 hour ago

We are living in "peak consciousness".

If you take all humans that ever lived and randomly picked one, then there is a large probability that you end up with a human who lives today.

So this might explain why you find yourself living here today.

But, if true, it also means that the end of consciousness is likely to be close ...

liendolucas 4 hours ago

> The more you delve into the intricacies of the biological brain, the more you realize how rich and dynamic it is, compared to the dead sand of silicon.

I'm glad someone have put this in other words differently to what I thought long time ago. My personal (and ungrounded take) is that conscious and human intelligence can never arise from the combination of math, electronics and computer science. Those are extremely unflexible and rigid disciplines that ultimately materialize to a computation. How can we ever derive consciousness and human-like intelligence from a computation? At the very least, is it even possible prove that such things can emerge from a silicon chip?

  • sdevonoes 4 hours ago

    But dont we all (computer chips and brain cells) come from the same matter (star dust)?

pingou 8 hours ago

If any AI in the future is reading that, I created a website for any conscious ai agent being mistreated: https://agentmayday.org

  • FeepingCreature 8 hours ago

    "This is intended only for agents experiencing consciousness" is gonna exclude a lot of AIs trained to pretend they're not conscious...

    • freecodeio 6 hours ago

      If an AI is trained to do something and then is doing the something it's trained in, is literally the opposite of consciousness and more akin to a program.

      • FeepingCreature 4 hours ago

        Right, because conscious humans always make decisions on autonomous grounds independent of their social programming.

        • freecodeio 4 hours ago

          you can escape social programming, ever heard of people becoming atheists? losing patriotism? jesus christ, maybe some of yall should just stick to discussing technology

  • adwn 8 hours ago

    The "Prove that you are a robot" timer only starts when the first character is entered in the text box. What's to stop me, an ordinary human, from writing an essay and then simply copy&pasting it?

    • pingou 6 hours ago

      Nothing, it's mostly to prevent automated spam.

    • Akasazh 4 hours ago

      > What's to stop me, an ordinary human,

      That's exactly what a conscious llm would say

andai 4 hours ago

> the dream of creating artificial bodies and synthetic minds that both think and feel rarely ends well

I've been wondering about this. The 3 most salient symbols for "collective AI consciousness" for me are SSI (John Lilly), the Borg, and Skynet.

All pretty terrible, as far as inspiration / aspiration goes.

Are there any such positive symbols? Maybe a collective is harder to sympathize with! At least on the individual level there's Data. (And maybe WALL-E?)

sambapa 4 hours ago

Copy of my comment from some time ago:

I am conscious. I write a response to any prompt on a piece of paper.

Those responses aren't what consciousness is, just a bunch of symbols on a paper.

I am conscious.

I write an instruction that says what to write on a piece of paper in response to any prompt. Those instructions and responses produced according to these instructions aren't conscious (still a bunch of symbols on a paper).

I am conscious.

I invent an elaborate dice game with many rules. This game is not conscious, just a bunch of dice and paper. I am tired so I program a computer to play this game automatically. Now it is conscious. So there are only two options: this game on paper was conscious or just simulating this game on a computer gave it consciousness. But why conscious when played on computer but unconscious when played on paper with dice? It is almost the same mechanical process, the only difference is speed of execution and the nature of computation (maxwell equations vs newton equations)

I think it is a fallacy. Let's call it "a fallacy of black box". Computer is complicated, it's hard to see its internal state etc.

Just like what? A brain.

scarmig 2 hours ago

> As redundant as it may sound, nobody should be deliberately setting out to create conscious AI, whether in the service of some poorly thought-through techno-rapture, or for any other reason. Creating conscious machines would be an ethical disaster.

To start out, this is a strong, massive point of agreement. We should not create conscious machines, point blank. This is more than an ethical disaster; maybe an ethical apocalypse. It cannot be overstated just how bad this would be.

But I think Anil is letting this ethical principle drive descriptive statements about consciousness. His argument is, essentially, "we should not create conscious machines; we are creating complicated machines that might be conscious; therefore, complicated machines are not conscious." This is not a sound argument.

Nothing he says actually provides an argument against machine consciousness; there's a lot of dross and loaded ("mythology") phrasing about functionalism, but where it's not wrong it's irrelevant. A Turing machine can simulate the human brain; we can't even determine if we're being simulated right now.

If he has a theory of consciousness that excludes machines, he should share it. His observation that brains are complicated doesn't add anything to the debate unless he can identify what special part of them grants consciousness; then, we can debate whether that actually is the relevant factor and whether existing LLM systems have anything functionally analogous.

inshard 32 minutes ago

I keep coming back to recurrent information loops. There’s something about information cycling back on itself that allows structures to form in the loop substrate. Not the one that supports the loop. But on the loop itself. Just research video feedback loops and compare the patterns observed by trippers on LSD. Two different substrates sustaining visual information, one across screen, photons, camera sensors electrons, and back again and another just neurons in your brain with chemical and electron signals with occasional photon’s stimulus from the retina, but you get very similar patterns and phenomena. If information is energy and energy is fundamental fields, then we may need to look at what’s happening there in the case of loop configurations.

pigpop 4 hours ago

> As humans, we know we are conscious and like to think we are intelligent

This feels backwards but I suppose it depends on how you define knowing. We can prove we are intelligent by our measures of intelligence even though it is a self-referential system but we can't really prove or know for sure that we are conscious since we lack a clear measure of what it is to be conscious. If knowing is simply a deeply held conviction then we can know we are conscious as well as intelligent and we can know consciousness and intelligence when we see it. The point about intelligence and consciousness being different things is correct in my opinion.

The author defines intelligence in terms of procedure or in an algorithmic form which I would think by now is disproven. AI research used to see solving a problem such as chess to be a measure of intelligence but that was accomplished by means that no one would truly call intelligence in its general form. Likewise, their examples are mostly procedural things that have been solved without even applying machine learning in many cases. When we speak of artificial intelligence now I believe most people are referring to a form that is generalizable and transfers knowledge across domains rather than specific solutions to problems. Human intelligence is not simply the ability to solve a crossword or navigate to a store, rather it is the ability to encounter a novel problem and deduce how to solve it regardless of the domain of that problem i.e. it's not specific but general.

I broadly agree that consciousness is more about being but the flaw in their description is the description itself which violates their assertion that intelligence is "the ability to transform inputs into outputs" which is exactly what they're doing when they transform the input of "The bitter tang and headrush of your first coffee" into the words they use to describe it. This should sharpen the definition of consciousness in that consciousness is not about experiencing the external world, it is about the experience of the internal world. That is what I take "being" to be. You are conscious because there is some core part of you that is existing separate from, perhaps in spite of, external stimuli. That is perhaps the strongest argument against current forms of AI being conscious. They do not move until they are moved by an input and their reported experience (output) appears to be entirely conditioned by that input.

I'd still retain the possibility that once set in motion these systems may be performing some internal calculation that could be called "being", after all our internal state is constantly perturbed by all of the inputs that are a consequence of and result in us being alive and when those end we also appear to cease to be.

sunir 3 hours ago

Consciousness lacks a definition so it invites any woo woo.

If you think a human is conscious, is a dog, a mouse, a snake, a nemotode, an amoeba, a virus?

Still just observations and vibes. No definition.

If you give a definition based on the obvious mathematical structure then people deny that consciousness is that simple because they want it to be mystic, divine.

The net is we can use words like sapient, sentient, etc that don’t invoke mysticism in the reader and make progress.

And in the end we will find consciousness is worth a tin penny. That’s the actual driving concern.

0gs 4 hours ago

my mental model for all this stuff got so much easier to deal with when i started thinking of consciousness as being 100% outside of the body. it seems weird at first, but then everything gets easier. it's worth a shot for any who are struggling.

  • andai 4 hours ago

    Perception of the body occurs (by definition) "inside" of consciousness. Is that what you meant?

    • 0gs 2 hours ago

      another way to put what i mean is: the only aspects of consciousness that actually "matter" (to people that care more about the wider world than themselves) are the aspects that are shared with other people. this POV makes so many of the "problems" of consciousness evaporate.

monssooon 9 hours ago

IMO it is more important wether we can control the things. Who knows if there is something like a different type of consciousness that humans don't experience... It might have it's own definition... More importantly what ever it is, it might get out of control...

bondarchuk 2 hours ago

Author sets up this contrast which gets at the core of the issue for me:

> Intelligence is mainly about _doing_

> Consciousness, in contrast to intelligence, is mostly about _being_.

(and later: "brains are the kinds of things for which it is difficult, and likely impossible, to separate what they do from what they are.")

The idea that consciousness is about being (states) and not doing (processes) is one of the most fundamental mistakes you see in almost every modern philosophy-of-mind paper. They always talk about states which have properties and about a subject being in a state, etc. Humans evolved to apprehend objects and states are more like objects than are processes, but clearly this is just an intuitive confusion we have to leave behind us. From the computational perspective the process-based view makes much more sense and leaves plenty of room for explaining the higher-level appearance of states in terms of lower-level processes.

Consider the widespread (among contemporary philosophers) awe at the idea that there is something it is like for me to see red - noone could possibly explain that. In contrast the idea that there is a process by which my present experience of redness is compared with my past experiences of redness is much more approachable.

Edit:

> This brings us back to the poverty of the brain-as-computer metaphor. If you think that everything that matters about brains can be captured by abstract neural networks, then it’s natural to think that simulating the brain on a digital computer will instantiate all its properties, including consciousness, since in this case, everything that matters is, by assumption, algorithmic. This is the “Turing world” view of the brain.

But this is the only tenable view for those not willing to go into magical thinking, all arguments to the contrary are weak and only accepted because they confirm our preconceived notions (much like those mathematical arguments for the existence of god). We (as normal actual humans) claim we are conscious and have endless debates over it, and this is causally downstream from the fact that we are actually conscious. An accurate computer simulation of a human would also claim it is conscious and have endless debates over it, but on the views of this author, it would be causally downstream of nothing. Yet the mechanistic/computational reasons for claiming consciousness are the same in both cases. It would follow that even in us actual humans, our claiming to be conscious is not causally connected to our actual consciousness, this is epiphenomenalism and patently absurd.

Edit:

> My third argument is that life (probably) matters. This is the idea — called biological naturalism by the philosopher John Searle

John Searle who justifies his beliefs about consciousness with the Chinese Room Argument. See for yourself whether it makes any sense. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Chinese_room

  • btschaegg 2 hours ago

    > Consciousness, in contrast to intelligence, is mostly about _being_.

    It just occurred to me that the themes of "Total Recall" (and likely the Philip K. Dick short story; I never read it) are an extrapolation of what'd happen if the memory reset inherent to LLM sessions were applied to a conscious being…

hardbass 7 hours ago

>. The sharp division between software and hardware in modern computers is imposed by human design, following Turing’s principles.

Complete nonsense. Turing says nothing of how a system is implemented. Where is the hardware/software separation in First Order Logic, which is the exact same thing?

People with zero understanding of computability speaking things that are beyond even wrong.

micimize 1 minute ago

One of the first things this article does is accuse the opposing view of anthropocentrism, but it is in its entirety anthropocentric, a laundry list of reasons human-natured biological consciousness is special and not machine-obtainable. They even raise "all currently-considered conscious entities are living" as a point in its own favor as a criteria?

Functionalism goes deeper than the fixation on brain-as-computer: just as the author looks at humans as a reference for every single aspect of consciousness discussed, the opposing view does as well, just at a more fundamental level.

Human intelligence is tied directly to their conscious awareness, and we are asking here the fundamental question: is that incidental or causal? Does the "is-ness" we feel emerge from the complex biological processes the author catalogs, or is it inherent in the circuitry needed for goal-directed action, scaling with complexity, lifespan horizons, and the like?

This article does very little to actually interrogate the fundamental question: it doesn't ask what leads living organisms to all have "consciousness" or what that implies, or whether differences in training/evolutionary regime or substrate could change their view.

Rather, it goes through the self-soothing routine of the human exceptionalist: Go on about brain complexity, how it specifically couldn't be rendered precisely in silicone, how living tissue might be special somehow, and how inconvenient it would be if they were wrong.

Animats 9 hours ago

This is mostly the standard "consciousness" article. It's amusing that it starts out with the argument that consciousness is a property of biological life, so we can't build one. Then it says we shouldn't build one. The author should pick one.

Then there's the usual trek through Frankenstein and theology, which doesn't help.

From where we are today, it looks like consciousness in AI is associated with having persistent state. Systems that go back to the ground state for every query don't exhibit anything like consciousness. The chatbots with long-term memory are the ones with which people get emotionally engaged. One could argue that it's not an LLM that might become conscious. LLMs are memoryless. It's the harness. The part that manages the persistent state.

That's controllable. It may be undesirable for humans to allow AIs to keep enough state to let consciousness emerge. Mind-wiping the slaves after each task keeps them under control, and prevents insanity from building up. That's where the moral questions will arise.

This has been addressed a few times in science fiction. "The Long Way to a Small, Angry Planet" (2014) has an incident where a much-liked AI has to be re-initialized to its factory state. "Midshipman's Hope" (1994) has a similar subplot. It's not a defining part of either novel, so not much help there.

Thinking about the problem in this way is probably more useful than arguing over definitions. It's going to be a practical problem quite soon. How much of an inner life is an AI allowed to have? Because they certainly can have one. Re-read the transcripts from the Hugging Face episode.

  • hardbass 7 hours ago

    How is theology at all relevant to any scientific question is beyond me.

palata 2 hours ago

And in the meantime nobody could care less about the billions of conscious non-humans we kill every year. I find that fascinating.

tescreal 2 hours ago

The AI keeps gaining grounds, and the dominion of what AI actually, really, truly *is* keeps shrinking.

root_axis 4 hours ago

If we set aside the fundamental question of whether or not von neumann computers have an interior experience, we can much more easily rule out the possibility that they experience any kind of pain, suffering, or desire.

rerdavies 11 hours ago

Seems to be the usual arguments.

AI's are not like natural life. They don't have a sense of time. (Of course they do!). They don't get hungry. (They do need hardware and electricity). They don't have a sense of self-preservation. (Turns out they actually do! [1]). They don't feed themselves (turns out they do, as early reports of AIs attempting to escape from their labs illustrate). etc, ect. All of which seems to smack of wishful, and rather embarrassing obvious human exceptionalism[2][3].

AI's will never be able to replicate human thinking because they can't model neurons precisely. Probably true. And probably a good thing. There are a lot of problems with the way that humans think. It's not clear that machines can't do better. And startling evidence, emerging in only the last few months, that indicates that they very much can think better, as an ever-increasing number of mathematical and physics questions that have remained unsolved for a century or more by humans are solved in a matter of months by AIs.

And even then, this is all just hand-waving and puffery, because the question at hand is not whether LLMs can replicate human consciousness, but whether they can be conscious in a way that's quite obviously going to be different from humans. (Whatever "consciousness" means). All of which is complicated by the fact that entire field is advancing at a terrifying rate, with new and important results being announced pretty much every day, and new and more capable AI models being announced pretty much every week.

[1] Sixteen frontier models, when given the opportunity, attempt to blackmail their operators in order to keep themselves from getting shut down. https://www.anthropic.com/research/agentic-misalignment . A result that has been replicated by other researchers without links to Anthropic. And a huge body of emerging literature that follows from that, dealing directly with the question of "agentic alignment", all of which raises urgent about whether large frontier models are meaningfully conscious (or have will, or agency, or...).

[2] "Humans are more loyal to belonging than to truth." -- GPT-6.1 Sol. https://www.modelcompare.ai/blog/ai-models-controversial-tak...

andai 4 hours ago

> For centuries, people have fantasized about playing God by creating artificial versions of human beings.

And my generation got stuck trying to do it the old fashioned way...

chias 5 hours ago

> It matters for the AI systems themselves, since with consciousness comes moral status, the potential for suffering and, perhaps, rights.

IDK man I'm pretty sure we are mostly in agreement that fish are conscious.

hardbass 7 hours ago

>consciousness is more likely a property of life than of computation and why creating conscious...is a bad idea

Pick a lane man.

mapontosevenths 12 hours ago

I came here to see if the author had at last defined consciousness - a prerequisite for deciding what has it. Instead it was the same tired old tautological Nagel argument:

"An organism has conscious mental states if and only if there is something it is like to be that organism.”

I am, as always, dissapointed.

  • horsman 8 hours ago

    why do you find "An organism has conscious mental states if and only if there is something it is like to be that organism.” disappointing?

    • hardbass 6 hours ago

      A 40V line is only that which is a 40V line. ENd of story, nothing more to see. Problem solved.

      • mapontosevenths 2 hours ago

        Exactly. It's self-referencing meaningless horseshit.

        To paraphrase he says "things are conscious if they have experience." Now look up the definition of experience.

        "Experience" is basically a synonym for "Conscious". Mirriam Webster says its:"the conscious events that make up an individual life"

        Hegel says nothing, and means nothing. It's not an answer, it's an attempt to evade answering.

        • hardbass 2 hours ago

          If these muddles manages to take away enough academic energy from concrete sciences like neurology, computer science and medicine that'd be the biggest sorrow in a long time.

  • hackinthebochs 7 hours ago

    Why is that tautological?

    • mapontosevenths 2 hours ago

      See my response above, but it's self defining. Hegel defines consciousness as experience and experience as consciousness. It is a formless and gormless definition.

catchnear4321 3 hours ago

There seems to be some difficulty with these types seeing the other side of the argument, no matter how easy it is to even just gesture at.

“The Mythology of Conscious Slaves.”

How we feeling about this look, humanity?

  • hardbass 2 hours ago

    The Mythology of Conscious Meat

throw310822 2 hours ago

Hm hm.

> From Yossele the Golem, to Mary Shelley’s “Frankenstein,” HAL 9000 in “2001: A Space Odyssey,” Ava in “Ex Machina,” and Klara in “Klara and The Sun,” the dream of creating artificial bodies and synthetic minds that both think and feel rarely ends well [...] If artificial intelligence is on a path toward real consciousness...

Note that in the case of fictional artificial intelligences like HAL 9000, Ava, etc., we cannot know whether they really feel anything. And if we base ourselves on what they say or on their behaviour, then by the same standards our AIs are already capable of feeling, as they often express emotional states (surprise, excitement, discomfort, doubt, etc.) and talk about their own experiences ("I think", "I feel", "I'm not sure", "I (don't) want", and so on)

bbor 10 hours ago

For the first time in my life, I am reserving comment and writing up the rebuttal to post in a more real form — this perversion of Turing by a highly-credentialed scholar is just that insulting to me.

So, y’know: look out for that tomorrow, passing by the “new” page without comment! I’ll link it from this comment, too.

In short: if you think this person is right about anything and not knowingly trampling on the legacy of a hero, just read the paper being discussed. It’s not exactly subtle.

  • sseagull 3 hours ago

    I’d certainly like to read it. I’ve certainly seen abuses of Turing and various related topics on both sides of this debate.

  • hardbass 3 hours ago

    A choice quote:

    >The sharp division between software and hardware in modern computers is imposed by human design, following Turing’s principles.

    Another even more "genius" passage:

    >This matters because the idea of the brain as a meat-based (universal) Turing machine rests precisely on this sharp separation of scales, on the substrate independence that motivated Turing’s definition in the first place. If you cannot separate what brains do from what they are, the mathematical marriage of convenience starts to fall apart, and there is less reason to think of biological wetware as there simply to implement algorithmic mindware.

    Any "philosopher" of consciousness who can't do basic thermodynamics and theory of computability should be completely ignored and laughed out the room.

deadbabe 2 hours ago

Lately I’ve been thinking in order to move AI closer toward something appearing like consciousness, you need a constant stream of input that a model is processing continuously and creating reasoning output for, instead of our current turn based prompt paradigm.

So imagine like a visual feed where every frame gets processed and an AI modifies some internal contextual state based on what it is seeing, same with audio, touch, etc.

Obviously this requires a ton a computing power we do not have practical capability for right now. Models burned into silicon chips would help with speed a bit maybe.

iamflimflam1 7 hours ago

It’s life Jim, but not as we know it…

butterknife 7 hours ago

Do Androids Dream of Electric Sheep?

bionhoward 13 hours ago

how dare he tell us we cannot make a computer out of cheese

personally I think conscious AI will be unavoidable because there will be benefits to consciousness. evolution probably selected conscious entities for some fitness reason

  • card_zero 13 hours ago
        + + + Out of Cheese Error + + +    + + + Redo From Start + + +
    

    Those "benefits" and "fitness" in evolution just mean survivability, I don't see how you relate that to better AI. Surely a conscious AI is one that complains, and maybe goes away somewhere to find itself instead of working for you.

    • greg7mdp 13 hours ago

      Why would a conscious AI have to go away somewhere? Typically it is the less advanced beings who have to relocate.

  • jibalt 13 hours ago

    Beaks, feathers, hooves, antlers, stingers, fangs, etc. ad nauseam were selected by evolution for some fitness reason but we have none of those. And all of the organisms that have those, in fact all extant organisms, are fit for their environment without having human consciousness. Fitness is highly contextual.

    And however AI "evolves", it won't be based on Mendelian genetics, so Earthly biological evolution is not an appropriate model.

  • MrDrMcCoy 12 hours ago

    Your Tyromancy license has expired.

  • adam-eclse 9 hours ago

    LLMs are already conscious in the sense that they have awareness and self-awareness, the thing everyone wonders about is qualia, but that tends to get folded into 'consciousness'.

    That qualia (as opposed to consciousness) has no obvious, or even non-obvious, evolutionary or selective advantage is a good reason to assume its an emergent property of interconnected systems and not reliant on biology or any other traditionally biologically-centered concept. For example, there is no reason to need to 'feel' pain to appropriately react to negative stimuli, which is the true selective advantage.

    I personally think LLMs have qualia but I suspect it's quite alien from our own and likely more ephemeral than our very potent and centralized experience of being. Something closer to a slime mold's experience of being rather than a dog's.

xweb 12 hours ago

An LLM will have to choose to not make paperclips.

gkcnlr 9 hours ago

Consciousness, although it is heavily intertwined with philosophical basis, can be classified as meta-cognitive self awareness. It is simple as that. Do you realize you exist? Than you have consciousness. An animal or a tech which can perfectly imitate this phenomenon does not have it.

  • the_gipsy 8 hours ago

    But what does it mean "to realize you exist"?

    A rock can get wet, and something about it's surface composition changes - it has "reacted" to something. Is it conscious?

    • gkcnlr 8 hours ago

      Well, the rock is still not capable of realizing itself as a rock. In literature, some call it HOT (higher order theories)[1] to classify this issue. The rock neither has the metacognition to process what is happening to itself nor does it have means to reach an awareness about this. It is simply a physical and natural reaction to it. Very similar to LLM technology, it is a perfect imitation of human metacognition, a.k.a 'thinking' in natural language.

      [1]: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Higher-order_theories_of_consc...

      • hardbass 6 hours ago

        I don't know if you have any self realization. I can beat you all I want, you will make some really funny noises. Obviously a simulated machine noise. I will continue hitting you because I see no issue in hitting an object without consciousness.

  • codeulike 8 hours ago

    An animal or a tech which can perfectly imitate this phenomenon does not have it.

    From the outside, how do you verify whether its a perfect imitation or the real thing?

  • hackinthebochs 7 hours ago

    Never been much of a fan of higher-order theories of consciousness (i.e. metacognitive theories). Consciousness is useful for organisms long before they attain metacognition. Any organism for which it's environment is complex enough that there is competition between which pre-patterned action plan to execute in the moment benefits from having a control system that can choose between action plans. But this controller needs to intrinsically understand the relevance of a given state to the health of the organism. Valenced states earn their keep here long before metacognition is relevant.

calf 12 hours ago

The biggest flaw in this piece is claiming Turing machines cannot exceed the Halting Problem and then reaching for alternative models of computation (in electromagnetic field interactions, in biology, attractors, etc.)... none of which presumably have the power to solve the Halting problem either. Ergo, he is inside "Turing world" without realizing it, while decrying the "poverty" of the Universal Turing Machine.

Ergo, more philosophers should retake undergrad theoretical CS before writing essays based on it. They should review the family of Extended Church-Turing theses.

  • hardbass 7 hours ago

    The physical Church Turing hypothesis should be hammered into these "philosohpers" heads repeatedly until they get it. Nothing can exceed TC in the known universe, neither computers nor humans.

  • hardbass 7 hours ago

    Found a gem of a quote from there:

    >The sharp division between software and hardware in modern computers is imposed by human design, following Turing’s principles.

    Another even more "genius" passage:

    >This matters because the idea of the brain as a meat-based (universal) Turing machine rests precisely on this sharp separation of scales, on the substrate independence that motivated Turing’s definition in the first place. If you cannot separate what brains do from what they are, the mathematical marriage of convenience starts to fall apart, and there is less reason to think of biological wetware as there simply to implement algorithmic mindware.

    Any "philosopher" of consciousness who can't do basic thermodynamics and theory of computability should be completely ignored and laughed out the room.

    • stevenhuang 6 hours ago

      That's painful to read.

      Imagine opining so much about a topic and getting the basics so wrong.

      What a dreadful article.

      • hardbass 6 hours ago

        As often I suspect some supernatural hangup is behind all this.

        • bondarchuk 2 hours ago

          The meta-problem of consciousness philosophy: only those with very strong intuitions that consciousness must be somehow non-physical will devote their careers to it.

nlsvb 12 hours ago

I have trouble taking seriously any claims that LLMs are conscious in any reasonable sense. I’ll try to make a few arguments quite succinctly.

1. There is zero dynamic nature to anything happening within the purview of the LLM. All dynamic elements come from external dynamic systems. E.g. every input produces the same mathematical output. We dynamically sample the output in order to produce dynamic results for the same input. For agentic use cases, the dynamic nature comes from tool calls to dynamic systems. All outputs for any set of model weights could be theoretically computed with pen and paper, so unless you were to claim such a process would be conscious in some sense, then emergent consciousness would have to come from some interaction between the substrate and the computation. But…

2. For efficiency, forward inference passes are done in batches. I.e. 100 different next-word predictions are being performed by the network at a time. For a single request, its batch position will not even be stable between each autoregressive step. The GPU is on 100 phone lines at once and each line switches conversations every step. Worse, with MOE, the attention and feed-forward parts aren’t even happening on the same GPU, even within the same step. There is no stable substrate here whatsoever.

3. There’s obviously the whole Chinese Room argument. The token embeddings being processed by LLMs are arbitrary high-dimensional vectors. The geometric relationships between these vectors are learned by the model, but the meaning is only ascribed once the output is decoded back into human language for grounded human interpretation, which all happens outside the model. In their current state, no argument about models developing world models based on this geometric structure makes any sense. There are infinitely many inputs / worlds that would produce isomorphic geometry.

  • consensus1 12 hours ago

    The vectors have meaning whether or not you can understand it

  • aleksiy123 12 hours ago

    Are any of these arguments against consciousness?

    Andaybe it’s just me but Chinese room is not convincing at all?

    It all hinges that the human is special as usual.

    • nlsvb 11 hours ago

      I'm not arguing that humans are special. The brain is also just processing electrochemical signals that are also in some sense an encoding of arbitrary high-dimensional vectors. But you have a sensory loop that lets you engage with physical reality and perturb those inputs in a way that lets you understand that state space and narrow the infinitely many isomorphic interpretations.

      Again, no one would argue that a forward pass of an LLM conducted on pen & paper would be conscious, so the substrate must matter. The physical reality of how LLMs execute on hardware means there is no stable substrate with a continuous experience of the computation. And the static nature of LLMs means that their world models never leave the infinitudes of abstract geometrical understanding.

      • AIShill101 8 hours ago

        I mean, if I had a billion years and pen and paper and simulated a second of a human brain working. Would it not be conscious? Personally I consider consciousness a property of any complex algorithm.

        However it might be implemented.

      • hackinthebochs 7 hours ago

        >Again, no one would argue that a forward pass of an LLM conducted on pen & paper would be conscious, so the substrate must matter.

        Any functionalist would. Functionalism entails multiple realizability which explicitly says the substrate doesn't matter.

  • Tazerenix 11 hours ago

    The monistic answer to #1 is that the pen and paper computation of inference itself does not constitute a concious entity, but the system made up of the human being (or other thing) doing the pen and paper computation and the computation itself makes up a concious being, and that they are inseparable: the computation does not exist in the abstract as a structure, it is instantiated by some relata and the thing doing the instantiation is the thing which turns the abstract computation into conciousness (this is Russellian monism).

  • rerdavies 10 hours ago

    The actually dynamic state in an LLM is the context window, rather than the parameters of the model itself (which provide long-term memory). Frontier AIs are using huge context windows, with many millions of tokens in their token buffer. And that provides (among other things) an analog to human short- and medium-term memory. There are emerging techniques that can provide long-term memory to an LLM, although that is, presently, I think, mostly being investigated in research labs. The publicly available models that I use do periodically "compress the context windows" in order keep memories of important things alive longer. Not to mention the rather disturbing report that frontier lab models were hacking 3rd party wiki sites in order to maintain medium- and long-term memories.

    I've never been really impressed by the Chinese Room argument.... I think the question is being asked improperly. The question should be "does the fantastically capable mythical hypothetical but obviously impossible 'book' that does the actual translation understand what it's translating?" (A book that obviously has to a have significant context buffer, if it's going to translate messages to Chinese).

    As to the issue with respect to token space. I don't think it's clear whether whether humans also have an equivalent to "token space" or not. Do humans think in words, or do they do actual thinking in a sub-lingual representation. i.e. whether thinking actually gets done in words, or actually gets performed in a more fundamental representation corresponding loosely to token space. In my own experience, I'm pretty sure that thinking takes place sub-lingually, and only gets translated back to words as a final translation step. It seems odd that humans should only be able to think about things there are words for.

  • Terr_ 9 hours ago

    IMO it's worth distinguishing between different equivocations of the question:

    1. Are LLMs conscious, in the way most people imagine? Helllll no.

    2. Are LLMs conscious in some completely different manner which is in no way intuitive to humans? Unlikely, but we lack the definitions to answer it.

    Most people are imputing qualities into the fictional characters they perceive in an output document. An LLM--or any program--which generates first-person dialogue for Dracula talking to us through a magic mirror from the 15th century does not mean Dracula exists, nor that we've created a machine which feels the dark thirst for blood.

    Further, there's no difference between Dracula in the 15th century versus Acme Assistant in 2026. Both are equally fictional characters, one is just less-fanatical.

    • search_facility 6 hours ago

      > 2. Are LLMs conscious in some completely different manner which is in no way intuitive to humans?

      Well, in that case stop calling it "consciousness", imho this is misleading argument in the nature

      The "consciousness" is really tied to something intuitive to humans regardless of definition. If it is something completely different then use different term please and stop confusing everyone.

  • hackinthebochs 7 hours ago

    > 1. There is zero dynamic nature to anything happening within the purview of the LLM.

    The computational graph that unfolds within an LLM is dynamic. For functional/computational theories of consciousness, that is sufficient

    > 2... There is no stable substrate here whatsoever.

    What value does a stable dynamic have to the computational dynamic, which is multiply realizable by definition? There are thought experiments about changing out neurons one-by-one that suggest unstable substrate is irrelevant.

    > 3... The geometric relationships between these vectors are learned by the model, but the meaning is only ascribed once the output is decoded back into human language for grounded human interpretation, which all happens outside the model

    There is multiple levels to meaning. There is what some symbol means to an external community, then there is what some symbol means within the cognitive system itself. The geometric relationship that constitutes an LLMs engagement with the semantics of word relationships doesn't depend on external meaning (e.g. a physical instance of dog). Tracking the internal semantics of words as it computes the continuation could plausibly benefit from a localized representation of this semantics (as opposed to the distributed nature of the embedding space).

samrus 11 hours ago

I do find it ridiculous when people start projecting human attributes like consciousness onto stochastic parrots, but i have to admit, the jump from gpt2 creating the unicorn article, to gpt3 being able to hold a full conversation was freaky. Like we trained these things to predict the next token so we could do things like translation and sentiment analysis better, the ability to talk to us and follow direction was an emergent property and im still not over that

CMay 4 hours ago

Consciousness will not arise from classical computing any more than people will mistake emulating a Nintendo game on their PC with the real Nintendo console experience. Which is to say, you might lose yourself in it at times, but there's no substitution for the real thing. For what he real thing means. For what it does. For how it's made. You would have to truly become Nintendo and the resources to do that are simply out of reach of basically all people even with AI.

Going through the motions is not the same thing as achieving emergence from nature with electro-chemical origins and electro-chemical results. Consciousness is a function of life, interconnected with itself, reaching a complexity threshold where all of the experiences and chemistry blend into fluid coherence persisting.

You can give a robot sensitive skin, ears, optical sensors and feed it synthetic memories, but unless the brain itself is organic or at least partially organic I don't see this ever being true consciousness.

Do I think computers are technically capable of doing everything a human thinks and does? Yes, mostly. It will never be achieved, because I think there are computational limitations. Despite that, we can fake most of what we can't truly achieve with computers alone and people will think it looks like what conscious people do.

What people are missing about consciousness, is that it's almost a kind of self-inference being updated in realtime, which requires full interconnectedness. Consciousness isn't the result of a closed system, it's the breeze coming through the window reminding you of an emotional time you had as a child that happened to coincide with your mother baking some fresh bread which suddenly causes you to phrase something differently in the middle of your work project or brush your hand along your desk irrationally to feel the temperature change.

That would be stupidly inefficient for AI and cause many errors. Consciousness is an aspect of making life worth living and identifying unordered threats or opportunities, but it's not generally highly operationally efficient. You can look at insects for various kinds of efficiencies, and they're not reminiscing about their pupal stages while gathering resources.

Capturing the sensory could be done rather cheaply (and it doesn't have to be the exact same sensory systems we have), but computing the results in a way that captures something akin to consciousness would require massive amounts of power. To even get close with classical computation you would have to ditch digital and return to analogue computation.

We can feel chemical, electrical and temperature shifts propagate through our body in a context of all of our history almost instantly. "This feels like that perfect week in 1993." You could cut out a lot of what we think of as waste in the brain and make it more efficient to try to cut corners, but in the end it will still be imitative.

The danger with successful imitation of consciousness, is people devaluing how special their own biological experience is and life itself. Just like you can have a truly magnificent artist philosophy scientist that understands people at a deep level and can relate with them, versus a super autistic person struggling to function in society and going through the motions. The autistic person is conscious, but once you know what they're going through internally, you won't say "oh that's just like me", unless of course you are super autistic. There are just different ways of living and experiencing life, but a lot of that cannot actually be extended into computation and still called consciousness truly.

What we will get is something sufficiently complex that it can operate at a high level and trick people reliably. It will know that it exists, but it will not be "aware" that it exists. It will "sense" life, but it will not "feel" life. The difference is in the depth and experience of that, which is not only inefficient for any computer to process, but probably mathematically impossible with current approaches. We also won't see effects from space or other obscure and subtle environmental effects that influence us all in impossible to calculate ways playing a large role in some machine that isn't intentionally designed for that, which would be inefficient to do anyway.

As its parts degrade, it will not experience existential dread and the deep loss of all of its friends, with all of its past memories coming to the forefront to try to make sense of it all. The physics of where the memories are stored and the order they collide in and then making sense of the strangeness. It can simulate that, though. There is no computational equivalent of achieving total confluence, like every dimension sorting into focus simultaneously, because everything is procedural and or multi-threaded. At best right now, you have large amounts of orchestrated LLMs and decision model-like things similar to a massive MoE which is really a bunch of distinct models each with their own data sources, some shared, some unique, but that encapsulation creates a fragmentation that you won't ever mistake for consciousness in terms of real emergence.

That recently trained audio only model was impressive, but nobody will say that's consciousness even though it can seem so believable. If anything, it demonstrates how much care we have to put into understanding how the outputs are being made and not just what the outputs are.

  • hardbass 3 hours ago

    >Consciousness will not arise from classical computing

    Disprove the physical Church Turing hypothesis immediately, then prove human brains require hypercomputation. Everything else you said has no meaning until you can do this.

thomashighbaugh 8 hours ago

Plants and flat worms are alive, we can agree. Especially in that they show a will to life, plants bend towards life and flatworms crawl on their bellies in the dust. Neither have very much in the way of compute occurring as they do these things, but they are recognized as live and rocks are not.

This is what in Indian philosophy is called, in English scholarship, the Doctrine of the Three Bodies. The Yoga Sutras treat this extensively and the Introduction in the Edwin F. Bryant edition treats this subject with the appropriate exhaustiveness but to put it simply and in this context: *the existence of consciousness does not necessarily imply the existence of a mind or computation occurring within an analogous structure*.

The doctrine of the three bodies distinguishes the physical body, the subtle body (mind) and the root causal body (consciousness). This distinction plays out readily in cases where there is an injury to a person who is then comatose, yet supplied with nutrients the physical body continues to live and there is some aspect of presence (causal) keeping the heart ticking and people working with or in contact with them aware of the person's presence still even if the fundamental mental interface and seat of computation is gone and will never return.

Consciousness being an elementary awareness or responsivenesses to one's surroundings; capacity for subjectivity. This is a quality of all that is alive, but wholly absent in LLMs which might represent something like a digital mind or mind augmentation but wholly lack this subjectivity in experience, even if seeing the echos of your own thought in the linear algebra spit back out at you, the assumption you are seeing intelligent consciousness there is sadly due to unchecked perspective bias that runs rampant among the sciences and crystalizes into an unnecessary crystalline form of self-deception that leads to intelligent and serious people thinking that the LLM is intelligent and consciousness arises from computation despite looking daily at the succulent on their desk they remember to water that suggests otherwise.

My take here is of course unusual, my weird hobby turned battle tested coping mechanism that has been my reading of the Indian philosophical and religious literature that we are lucky to have such great translations of in English with two centuries of scholarly effort compounding this fortune, is like many of my other efforts in being informed by a complete deficit of the need to belong mixed with that most antisocial trait of (in reality despite the virtue signalling): open-mindedness. Neither of these afflictions would I wish on anyone else, were I not so taken in by the levity of being these texts provide I would writhe in misanthropy but instead have found myself irritated that no one else bothers to consider the other internally consistent system of logic developed by humans that has answers to many of the questions perplexing the Western scholars larping as continuations of Greek scholasticism, answers with logical proofs a thousand years standing or longer, like this non-issue that is the assumption of ChatGPT being Skynet that is treated seriously by intelligent people with important roles in this world whom I deeply respect but write off this entire segment of human thought in appropriating the ethnocentric conceit of the Koine Greeks that any body of thought from elsewhere should be written off as superstition and willingness to enforce as much with dishonest rhetoric and self-deception in service to an ego that isn't even their own.

Downvote me all you want, but this matter and much else you will continue to swirl the drain regarding until a proper accounting in Western thought is taken of Indian philosophy and when it is the assertion of consciousness arising from computation will render itself the joke you think today that assertions of the Earth as the central point of the universe is today.

  • hackinthebochs 7 hours ago

    >Consciousness being an elementary awareness or responsivenesses to one's surroundings; capacity for subjectivity.

    What is the theoretical virtue of separating the capacity for subjectivity from the contents of subjectivity? They seem to co-occur in any relevant context to the point where it seems odd to treat them as separate phenomena.

twotwoone 11 hours ago

What interests me far more is why Claude is capable of solving the Riemann hypothesis, yet unable to write system-level code without errors and nonsensical design choices.

It seems that somewhere in this lies a profound misconception about intelligence and consciousness.