Each key was sent in exactly one request to one provider, all within a few short windows in late October, and every request we sent during those windows was stolen. Some of the stolen keys came from requests that the provider rejected before a model ever ran—this tells us that the attacker was copying requests at the provider’s front door, and not somewhere deeper in the inference stack. In the other two breaches, some of the stolen requests were marked as ZDR. A privacy flag doesn’t help when the attacker is already inside.
This seems too incredible to be true. Every key being sent through these routers was stolen and reused? And no one has noticed this until now?
Every key sent to one provider, within a few short windows in late October, which was only a month ago. Probably some of the victims have by now noticed that somehow their AWS got hacked, but they wouldn't necessarily know why or how.
"We observe evidence of external access only for Grok, where we record 70 different canary activations over periods ranging from hours to days after their initial submission. These activations originate from 70 IP addresses spanning 48 ASes (Autonomous Systems) across 14 countries and 4 continents."
It's probably only the tip of the iceberg. They tested for credentials leak. People have used those inferences to execute shell commands through their agents.
Am I missing something here? Surprised this doesn't have more comments (of any form). Neither do the other reports of the same investigation from other outlets.
It *is* absolutely critical. I think the title may just be underselling it enough that people didn't realize what it was about and didn't click. A better title would probably be something like: "Prompts sent to OpenRouter routinely exploited by many bad actors". There it would make it to top of homepage.
Each key was sent in exactly one request to one provider, all within a few short windows in late October, and every request we sent during those windows was stolen. Some of the stolen keys came from requests that the provider rejected before a model ever ran—this tells us that the attacker was copying requests at the provider’s front door, and not somewhere deeper in the inference stack. In the other two breaches, some of the stolen requests were marked as ZDR. A privacy flag doesn’t help when the attacker is already inside.
This seems too incredible to be true. Every key being sent through these routers was stolen and reused? And no one has noticed this until now?
Every key sent to one provider, within a few short windows in late October, which was only a month ago. Probably some of the victims have by now noticed that somehow their AWS got hacked, but they wouldn't necessarily know why or how.
Possibly related: https://www.dragos.com/blog/ai-supply-chain-security-canary-...
Also this has been a thing in other providers as well, I think researchers at IMDEA also saw this happen in Grok https://dspace.networks.imdea.org/bitstream/handle/20.500.12...
"We observe evidence of external access only for Grok, where we record 70 different canary activations over periods ranging from hours to days after their initial submission. These activations originate from 70 IP addresses spanning 48 ASes (Autonomous Systems) across 14 countries and 4 continents."
It's probably only the tip of the iceberg. They tested for credentials leak. People have used those inferences to execute shell commands through their agents.
Am I missing something here? Surprised this doesn't have more comments (of any form). Neither do the other reports of the same investigation from other outlets.
It just didn't catch up, I think, luck is a big part of getting a post here to stay on the front page for long, unfortunately.
It's definitely something that everyone should be made aware.
It *is* absolutely critical. I think the title may just be underselling it enough that people didn't realize what it was about and didn't click. A better title would probably be something like: "Prompts sent to OpenRouter routinely exploited by many bad actors". There it would make it to top of homepage.
Related?
https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=50585962