The very first referenced issue in that PR discussion sheds a bit more light on this: https://github.com/adoptium/adoptium-support/issues/1480
This PR's author says there on October 1st: "Got an email from Oracle asking me to NOT proceed with a PR until receiving approval." and then on October 28th: "It's taken over by Oracle. Nothing required from us."
should have known at this point it's a potential security issue and maybe the AI regurgitated this:
https://github.com/adoptium/adoptium-support/issues/1480#iss...
edit: also oracle is big enough to have one of every modern gen to test on
The proper way to deal with a security bug in any Oracle software is to zero day it.
They are the biggest asshole of a company when it comes to anything, but especially security issues. They are one of the least friendly companies to security researchers and are likely to attack you with lawyers.
Fuck Oracle. We should be putting them out of business.
This is called throwing the baby out with the bathwater.
No, not really. This baby is rotten and infected with a corporate culture that looks to extract as much money out of you via any way possible, especially lawfare. If you're standing up with Oracle I need to point at the sign again.
The sign: "Do not fall into the trap of anthropomorphizing Larry Ellison. Think of Larry Ellison the way you think of a lawn mower. You don't anthropomorphize your lawn mower. Your lawn mower just mows the lawn. You stick your hand in there, it'll chop it off, the end. You don't think "oh the lawn hates me!" the lawn mower doesn't give a shit about you. Your lawn mower can't hate you. Don't anthropomorphize the lawn mower. Don't fall into that trap about Oracle."
I really struggle to understand why anyone would trust a company that started as a CIA domestic surveillance project. The government's tentacles are deeply embedded in this company, which is partly why they feel so emboldened to engage in lawfare against anyone who might challenge them.
> I really struggle to understand why anyone would trust a company that started as a CIA domestic surveillance project
Because the company didn't start as a CIA domestic surveillance project? CIA project, yes. CIA "domestic surveillance" project, no. The CIA, like any large org at the time, needed a way to store large amounts of data in a usable form.
It's weird how much this type of conspiratorial thinking has become commonplace here and in other tech discussions online. I'm not sure if there's just echo chambers people fall into where this is repeated enough that people assume it's true?
I’ve been using Java for 15 years and Oracle has never gotten a cent from me. YMMV though.
You paying money is just one wrong click by any employee away. Then the Oracle Global Licensing and Advisory Services is on you with an audit. And then you hire a consultant from the Oracle license consultant industry to help you through.
No it’s not.
Hi Larry.
There is no baby. This is throwing out the squatter in your basement.
I'm sure all the people compromised by a zeroday in java think they're a squatter in your basement.
sometimes Darwin solutions are the best solutions
Yesterday on a post I was stating that Responsible Disclosure has been the worst thing for computing ever. It has lulled humanity into the idea that computers are safe and we've built just massive amounts of digital infrastructure under that delusion.
If every bug was a zero day then we'd have never hooked things like water grids and electrical grids to networks. Grocery stores and bloodbanks would have never put freezers on the internet. Along with a million other huge security risks, too many to be named here.
The AI age has exposed that stupidity.
That's just not true. People don't hook up freezers to the internet because they think it's safe, they do it because it's cheap and convenient, and saves having to send someone out to manually check them every X hours. The free market doesn't reward more than legally minimum safety requirements.
Your view can be harmonized with your parent comment's view.
Capitalism rewards all sorts of safety requirements, if they become visible to a balance sheet within a reasonable period of time. Just look at marine insurance in the middle east right now.
The status quo is that IoT freezers are massively inconvenient every decade or so. Businesses can live out an entire lifecycle in this period of time, without the risk ever hitting their balance sheet.
pixl97 is saying: what if we made the risk far more common, so that its effect shows up on a balance sheet within 6-12 months?
> pixl97 is saying: what if we made the risk far more common, so that its effect shows up on a balance sheet within 6-12 months?
What is the purpose of this? It's just intentionally making hacks more common and a net negative for the economy.
More secure systems aren't inherently good. You don't hear people talking about how happy they are that break-ins are common and everyone locks their doors before leaving the house.
>More secure systems aren't inherently good.
I'm sorry buddy, but you were born in the wrong universe not to defend yourself.
The internet is a global network. This means people not under your sovereign jurisdiction can reach out and fuck with your data and you can do jack shit about it unless you want to take a bunch of other really expensive actions (for example economic or hot warfare).
Computer people should know better than thinking that the internet is anything other than an inherently hostile place. Groups we consider enemy nations share the same web space. Countries that make $1000 a year share the same web space, and all the juicy servers you leave insecure look like a very good way for them to become absolutely rich. Hell, even people in your own country are apt to get away with hacking with a little bit of skill.
The internet is not your neighborhood. You can't call the police to fix every little issue for you. It is a literal war zone, just most people are still in denial about that.
Now start treating it like that.
Because of the daddy state safety net, people are not risk aware. If they suffer the consequences they can always push for more state control in the spirit of "why did you let me do this". Whole prohibition stood on this idea.
What a ridiculous assertion. Do you go around sticking every small object in your mouth just because it doesn't have a sticker about chocking hazards?
The two most common causes of child death in the USA are parents running over their own children in their cars, and guns.
Please feel free to explain how people are not aware of the danger of running over their own children because of the daddy state, and how fun owners have somehow missed the dangers of guns.
The consequences are usually suffered by other people. You speed, other people die in the resulting crash. You get the freedom to make unsafe buildings and furniture and electrical goods for profit, other people die from them collapsing and burning down.
The results of directly querying wonder.cdc.gov reveal a record of tragedy that resists easy summary.
From 2019: """Motor vehicle crashes were the leading cause of death for children and adolescents, representing 20% of all deaths; firearm-related injuries were the second leading cause of death, responsible for 15% of deaths""" - https://pmc.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/articles/PMC6637963/
Well 'frontovers' (parent drives massive SUV over child because of vehicle's poor visibility below the hood) only kill 366 of the 4074 children killed in motor vehicle accidents every year, not most of them.
From 2026 - Letter to the editor, New England Journal of Medicine: """Previous analyses of mortality data from the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) showed that the leading cause of death among children and adolescents (defined as persons 1 to 19 years of age) shifted from motor vehicle collisions to firearm-related injuries in 2020.""" - https://www.nejm.org/doi/full/10.1056/NEJMc2600445
You know VPNs exist, right? Nobody has to hook their devices/freezers into the OPEN Internet.
Hell, what about the raspberry pi that logs all the temperatures and forwards them to the central supermarket logging system.
Why is there not a proxy so we don't need to expose the refrigerators to even a VPN?
I don't think this is the issue. Freezers are extremely reliable. They're built to operate 24 hours a day for years on end. They're also designed to maintain approximate temperature (when full) for about 2 days, so even a freak outage isn't that big a deal.
There's no real problem being solved. People just went that direction to follow trend of 'smart' everything because it's cheap, you can concoct hypothetical scenarios where it might be useful for marketing (regardless of whether or not they're at all realistic), and most importantly of all - complete lack of awareness about the risks involved.
> There's no real problem being solved.
There actually is. Humans are notoriously sloppy in following mundane, boring compliance bullshit tasks, and noting down freezer temperatures is what I'd say very high up on the list of bullshit tasks that are so pointless they're demeaning to the human who has to be the eyes for the machine.
Connecting the freezers to a central logging facility now needs no human checking the freezer every hour and writing down the temperature on a sheet of paper no one will ever read. It is precisely what machines are made for. And since compliance is now automatic instead of a strong incentive for the human to just invent "valid" data and be done, actual outages can now be spotted much faster.
Again for normal usage this is not a very realistic scenario. Freezers generally keep relatively near to their target temperatures, when full, for about 48 hours. A grocery store or something might have it as part of a routine maintenance schedule alongside bathrooms, trash bins, etc but this is hardly some problem that needs solving, especially not if one is aware of the risks.
The problem isn't keeping temperature, it's keeping logs of keeping temperature. Health departments usually are overworked to the brim so the records rarely get audited, but when they audit you and you can't produce the records or they are obviously faked, you're screwed. So you want/need a solution that's as centralised and automated as possible.
Getting informed about outages or pending outages (e.g. by not just monitoring target temperature but also motor temperature, current consumption and vibration) is just a nice cherry on top.
> People don't hook up freezers to the internet because they think it's safe
I don't think that's true.
They may have known there was a risk, but historically it was small. If they knew it was certain to be hacked before next Thursday most would stop doing it pretty quickly.
It's like driving. Every time you drive there's a small chance of an accident, but everyone still does it. If there was a 50% chance of death most would stop doing it pretty quickly.
Securely networking electrical grids offers improvements in reliability, which translates directly to safety. If the power goes off on a hot summer afternoon, people die. Networking enables faults to be detected and resolved faster, reducing the amount of time that the system stays in dangerous conditions.
Similarly, (securely) networking water treatment plants enables people to remotely verify that settings are where they're supposed to be and adjust them to match changing sample reports or intake conditions, reducing the risk of over-treating or under-treating the water, both of which can have safety consequences.
On top of that, networking enables much greater efficiency. Rather than having a person sitting at every substation ready to throw a breaker, or more likely, ready to drive there (taking time), you can have them sitting in a control room that monitors the whole grid at once.
Much of modern life would be much more expensive and much less safe without networking.
We really shouldn't throw the baby out with the bathwater. It is possible to build secure systems. It takes a certain degree of paranoia and dedication that humans find difficult, and a willingness and ability to respond quickly to unknown threats, but that doesn't make it impossible.
>Much of modern life would be much more expensive and much less safe without networking.
The modern world wouldn't work without gasoline, but it's burning the planet to the ground in the meantime.
If your efficiency is gained by taking the brakes off the car to make it lighter you're going to realize how bad you screwed up when it comes time to stop.
We've been playing a 30 year game of fucking around and we're reached find out time.
If we want to build secure systems we're going to have to flush about 95% of the programmers out there.
On the other hand, we wouldn't have gotten to fiber and 5G without spending some time on copper wires first.
I agree about one thing - incentives cannot work properly if it takes you 30 years to find out but your economy is built on 3 month business cycles.
We don't need to flush 95% of the programmers (though that is probably happening anyway). We need to flush 95% of the incentives to go fast and avoid spending money. Fast, cheap, or good - if you're very lucky and very good, you can squeeze two of them out of the equation. Most of the time, you're lucky to get even one.
We did know it was a potential security risk, and that is why it was handled exactly how security-sensitive issues are supposed to be handled (not to mention that the reporter is a well-respected OpenJDK contributor and former Oracle colleague).
I don't know if people here understand how these things need to be done in the most important and critical open source projects, such as Linux or OpenJDK, but there are two things you must not do when an issue is suspected to be a risk until you've researched the matter and decided on a backport and release strategy: You shouldn't communicate publicly, and you absolutely shouldn't merge a patch.
Well i understand where this view comes from, sometimes it can feel like its a net negative for security in the end.
Full disclosure might cause short term panic, but it does get things fixed quickly.
When your product runs the world, you need to coordinate exactly how a patch is released across multiple versions and when, and you don't want to tip your hand before everything is ready. A lot is riding on doing this right.
> You shouldn't communicate publicly, and you absolutely shouldn't merge a patch.
I (still) agree, but I don't think these rules will be valid for much longer, though.
With new models capable of finding vulnerabilities faster than ever before, if you (or your AI) was able to find a critical bug, it's only a matter of time that the bad guys will also discover it - if they haven't already.
Human skill and ingenuity used to be the limiting factor, so it was the universal equalizer. Now the game depends on how many tokens you want to throw at the problem, and there are many bad actors with incentives to outspend every white hacker out there.
Responsible disclosure will still be important, of course, but timelines will need to be compressed into days, instead of months.
This still does not change how security critical bugs should be handled.
It's expected that the ability to run models follows a power law distribution: very few actors are able to run the most expensive models on many codebases/binaries, spending lots of tokens on each project.
Disclosing a serious vulnerability potentially exposes it to orders of magnitude more people.
There is case to be made that with the LLM-powered vulnerability research any bug found with the help of an LLM should be considered public.
If I spent N tokens to find a specific funky bug, you should expect others to have done the same. In a way, in this modern age the full-disclosure guys had it right all along. Reality caught up with a three decade lag.
Also, for something that you could just deactivate, it's absolutely unacceptable for Oracle to take so long. Deactivating the intrinsic would have been a few-line patch that they could have easily ported to all branches and then communicated to other vendors. Shouldn't have taken more than 2 days to fix.
Shit like this is what forces people to just _merge_ fixes, why shouldn't they?
That would be irresponsible. A vulnerability isn't closed once you merge a fix, and not once you release builds. It's closed when users apply the patch in production. That takes time no matter how quickly you release, and could come at the expense of other things your users may want to do, including addressing other vulnerabilities. Turning a bug into an exploit can also take time, even with the help of AI.
So until you know how dangerous the bug is and have a plan for release (does it go in the next quarterly patch, which users are ready for, or are you making a special release?) you shouldn't do anything public because you don't yet know what to advise your users to do.
What about when you just want to get rid of crash ? Just merge, everybody recompile, end of the story. Thats exactly what for open source is.
Exploit shops can start months later to evaluating exploitability.
Timeline was:
- Jun 8: reported crashes
- Sep 9: (two months!) it was know base64 asm code is bad and patch was posted
No idea why anyone need to wait for anyone and especially on any corporation to apply the available patch !
So, it's 2 months later and Oracle is siting on their hands.
Then month and two weeks later Calif rediscovered crashes but this time person(s) involved have funny past time hobby: hacking :)
5 days later Oracle looks clueless, requesting info...
Two more weeks later Oracle have The Patch ! And recommends everyone to do nothing !
14-17 Nov: governments are informed :))) Thank you Calif for remembered about them ;) Somebody needs to tel governments they have problems...
17 Nov: Oracle gives fixes to the world...
Now governments are allowed and can start patching their infra...
Is any of this sane ???
It's almost half a year of exploitable Java on government and enterprises servers and fix was ready by half of that time.
Just nobody was allowed to compile open sources by themselves.
And all of this is optimistic version, thanks to code being available...
First, you need to know that the original reporter is a former Oracle employee who is a committer on the project and has direct, non-public access to Oracle.
> No idea why anyone need to wait for anyone and especially on any corporation to apply the available patch !
Because as soon as it was suspected to be a security risk we could not apply it. This is how security is done in critical products.
When you say "accept the PR", understand that we're not talking about applying it to mainline, but backporting it to all affected and supported versions. That is something that immediately draws attention. Then, a vulnerability is closed not when it reaches the codebase, but when it's deployed by the users to production, and users have the means to apply the regular quarterly updates, but not necessarily emergency ones (because there can always be other emergencies that occupy them). So what you need to do is investigate the risk and then decide whether to issue an emergency update or wait for the regular quarterly release.
The JDK is critical infrastructure, we simply cannot take cavalier, irresponsible actions of the kind you suggest; I would say insane, but I realise you're just unfamiliar with critical software security (I know you have good intentions and think it's fast, but we've been doing this for thirty years and know it's anything but). Think what would happen if every critical product would issue an emergency release with the maximal urgency advisory whenever any bug is thought to might be a vulnerability of an unknown severity.
Sorry, but we must take security matters extremely seriously, and handle them the right way (which is also the fastest way).
Now read first sentence of what I wrote:
> What about when you just want to get rid of crash ? Just merge, everybody recompile, end of the story.
Which action solves bug better ?
Because your industrial and official protocol is deeply flawed, change it.
But must agree that requiring users of open source code compiling it yourself is a bit a wish on my part :)
Still governments and corporations should simply pay a lot more attention to software they use.
Let's repeat: procedure that extends critical bug from 2 months into half a year should be changed.
> Because your industrial and official protocol is deeply flawed, change it.
No, it isn't. This is how security is (and has to be) done in critical products.
If something isn't a vulnerability then 1. we might not need to backport at all or not to many versions (although crashes usually are backported), and 2. we definitely not issue an emergency update. The fix goes into either the next major release (twice a year) or the next regular update (every quarter).
So there may be a few months between the time something is merged and the time it reaches users. But if it's a vulnerability you may want to do an emergency release, depending on the severity. If you don't know it's a vulnerability (let alone its severity) you really don't want the code sitting out there until you figure out.
> Let's repeat: procedure that extends critical bug from 2 months into half a year should be changed.
What happened on 16 June was a report of a crash in the GC. There was no reproducer, the cause wasn't known, and there wasn't a special reason to believe it had anything to do with a compiler intrinsic, let alone a serious vulnerability (a potential attacker also couldn't do something with that report, as the crash happened nowhere near the cause).
From the time the cause was discovered in September (which started the investigation into a vulnerability) to the time an emergency patch was released, it was a little over two months, and less than one month from the time Calif shared an exploit (which may have helped the decision to make an emergency release; don't know, I'm not on the security team).
I’m usually a java supporter because i have fond memories of working with it and great experiences from working with high throughput/low latency stuff written in java… HOWEVER: I’ll frame that comment as a smoking gun the next time somebody says java is fully independent from oracle (btw this used to also be me, but i clearly have to change my position)
Java fully independent from Oracle? Who would think that? The OpenJDK is mostly paid for by Oracle and Red Hat. Control always follows money.